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1.0 Introduction 
Climate change is becoming a part of our reality, both physically, through 
warming climes, melting ice caps and changing weather, and socially, 
through new ideas, institutions and political measures. According to the 
International Panel of Climate Change, our global society must go through 
deep economic and social changes to effectively mitigate and adapt to 
climate change (IPCC 2007). In this process, an abstract issue is becoming 
national and local, an object of governmental and municipal politics, of 
business decisions, of consumer choices, of voting behavior. The “global” 
issue of climate change is becoming local. 
Understanding the way political forces can shape social responses to 
environmental issues have been described as one of the most important 
intellectual challenges of our time (Steinberg & Vanderveer 2012, pos 
248-250)1.  All political actors contribute to transform the abstract issue of 
climate change into concrete changes or innovations. The environmental 
movement may play an especially important role through advocacy, 
information campaigns or direct action, environmental organizations can 
facilitate the necessary societal changes, both in opposition to, and in 
cooperation to other political actors. This is a study of what role the 
environmental movement takes in this process.  
My main research question is the following: what roles does the 
environmental movement play in making climate change a local issue? 
Studies of the environmental movement have largely focused on their 
impact on national and international politics. As Steinberg and Vanderveer 
(2012) argues, we need more knowledge about “the formative political 
experiences of environmental activists”, to avoid a “disembodied” 
understanding of the role of non-governmental actors in the global 
                                              
1 I own the Kindle (e-reader) edition of this book, and several others that I cite in this thesis. In 
this increasingly common digital format, most books do not have ordinary pagination. The pages 
are adjusted to the largest possible font on the device, and pages in “normal” fonts are divided 
into “positions”, not unlike the passages in the Bible. To make it possible to trace the sourced 
citations, I have seen it necessary to refer to these positions when no ordinary pagination is 
provided, abbreviated as “pos” in the in-text references. 
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environmental struggle (Steinberg &Vanderveer 2012: position 498). The 
environmental movement takes part in shaping the issue into concrete 
local action.  
This process also affects the organizations. Approaching a new issue may 
change their priorities, structure and forms of advocacy. The discovery of 
new environmental problems has, throughout the history of the movement, 
led to new forms of environmental activism, both through the 
establishment of new organizations, and through changes within 
established ones.   
To understand this process, we need a better understanding of the political 
experiences and assessments of people who work directly with climate 
change in their local communities.  My approach is strongly influenced by 
Asdal (2011) and Yearley (2005), who have both presented empirically 
based studies of how the complex issue of environmental activism can be 
interpreted sociologically and politically.  
The title of this thesis is inspired by one of my respondents, who wondered 
whether his environmental organization should have approached the 
climate issue at all. The established environmental movement is an “old 
dog”, and facilitating effective climate change activism may be the hardest 
trick that it has had to learn so far. Perhaps the dog is barking up the 
wrong tree. Perhaps a new dog should enter the arena. Perhaps we need to 
adjust the trick. In this study, I will try to shed light on these questions.  
1.1 The structure of this thesis   
In the following two subchapters, I will discuss how the global issue of 
climate change is becoming “local”, and how the environmental 
movement has become more centralized and professionalized, but may be 
moving back towards grassroots activities and popular mobilization.  
Chapter two will outline my choice of cases, my sources, my theoretical 
perspectives and my method, as well as including a discussion of my 
methodical challenges.  I start chapter three with an overview of the 
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current structure and strategy of my two cases, including their core 
philosophy and their budgetary prioritizations. Chapter four gives an 
overview of the attitude towards local activists on the central level, and of 
what kinds of programs the central level has initiated to include members 
in climate change-related activism. The fifth chapter will explore how 
local activists are working with climate change. Here, we will see that 
several chapters report that they do not work with the issue, or that they 
feel that the issue comes in conflict with other environmental concerns 
they struggle with locally. Here, we pause for a premature conclusion, 
which I will spend the following chapters problematizing: that climate 
change is not well fitted for local grassroots work.  The sixth chapter 
discusses how the organizations I study may be moving away from 
grassroots-based activism in general, and how professionalization and 
centralization affects the ability of local activists to address the issue.  In 
chapter seven, we delve into the different ways in which local activists see 
climate change, and how their perspectives are strikingly varied, and not 
set in stone. In the eight chapter, I will look at how several of the conflicts 
we have looked at are also tied to the local activist’s pride in their existing 
knowledge, and a failure to square this with climate change, or foster 
development of new expertise or modes of “cognitive praxis”. I will argue 
that the climate change issue is harder to implement on the local level 
because has been framed within a general conflict between “cognitive 
regimes” within the movement. Lastly, I will look at specific examples of 
climate-related “cognitive praxis” at the local level, which may provide a 
better understanding of how local climate change activism may be done 
effectively.  
In the text, I will refer to respondents by name when I quote them, directly 
or indirectly. I have made use of several of the organizations’ documents 
and web resources. I references these in footnotes. I also make use of two 
“field recordings” meetings I have attended. I was allowed to use these as 
part of my thesis. When quoting from these recordings, I will cite the 
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names of the people I quote, and reference the recording in the footnotes. 
Details about the interviews, external sources and recordings are listed in 
the appendix.  
1.2 Climate change – from global to local 
Here, and in the following two subchapters, I will explore how both the 
climate change issue and the environmental movement is on a path of 
“localization”. Climate change is a scientific term for the physical effects 
of global warming, a complex process that is only fully conceptualized and 
understood through mathematical models in the “global knowledge 
infrastructure” we call climate science (Edwards 2010:8). Understanding 
climate change requires information from several disciplines, and is based 
on a myriad of observations all over the globe. This global knowledge 
infrastructure has been connected coordinated by the United Nation’s 
International Panel on Climate Change, established in 1988. Their reports 
lay the scientific foundation for the United States Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and are used as an important framework 
for national climate policy.  
 In the public discourse, climate change is also an “issue” – a matter of 
public concern, which is understood in a political and cultural context. 
While our scientific conception of climate change may change through 
observations and modelling, the Climate change issue is more malleable. 
The social conceptualization of the issue affects the organization’s ideas 
about how, and at which political level, it can be addressed efficiently. 
Over time, these analyses may change, or be broadened to include new 
forms or levels of political action. This thesis will mainly concern climate 
change as a political and social concept.  
Climate change has predominantly been conceptualized as a “global” 
issue. Like the depletion of the ozone layer and the creation of acid rain, 
effectively addressing climate change requires international cooperation, 
as the greenhouse gas emissions are widely, if not evenly, distributed 
between all the nations of the world. While some issues are clearly more 
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global in scope than others – climate change being a prime example - the 
conceptualization of an issue as global is also result of a political strategy, 
both from politicians and NGOs. The “global-ness” of an issue is 
“significantly a matter of labeling and, so to speak, social construction” 
(Yearley 2005:52). 
  This process can be witnessed on other issues. Biodiversity has 
traditionally been championed through national or municipal policy, but 
has, since the 1974 Stockholm Conference and the 1992 Rio Summit 
increasingly become a global concern. A recent example is an article 
published in Nature June 2012, where ecosystems all over the globe was 
seen at a whole and the authors discuss whether a global “tipping point” is 
under way (Barnosky et al. 2012).  Different conceptualizations of issues 
may serve different political goals.  An understanding of biodiversity as an 
urgent global concern may underpin the ongoing attempts at creating a 
more effective global framework to preserve biodiversity through the 
United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity.  
As the climate issue has mainly been understood as “global”, the political 
response has largely taken shape as a top-down global effort. The 
experiences from the successful mitigation of the depletion of the ozone 
layer was the main foundation for the international response to climate 
change, which has taken shape as a UN-led convention – the United States 
Framework Convention on Climate Change - which binds countries to 
emission targets (Victor 2011:203). The experiences so far suggests that 
the top-heavy process has been deeply flawed. Despite over 20 years of 
negotiations, the concentration of CO2 rising more rapidly than in the 90s.2  
The issue of ozone depletion was by far easier to tackle through this top-
down framework than climate change has proven to be.  (ibid.) 
While climate change has been seen as one of the most “global” 
environmental problems of our age, understanding climate change as 
                                              
2 Gathered from Earth System Research Laboratory (2013)   
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strictly “global” can be problematic.  As Tsing (2005) has argued, this 
perspective can serve to undermine local understanding and conditions:  
The global scale is privileged above all others. In contrast 
to Linnean Plant Classification or Muir-inspired nature 
appreciaton, the global scale is the locust of prediction as 
well as understanding. Local conditions can be predicted 
from the global model; that is the point of its globality. 
Local data may adjust the global model but never defy it. 
Its globality is all-embracing” (Tsing 2005:102). 
Similarly, Yearley (2005) points out that there are problems with how the 
label “global” is used on environmental issues. The “global” label implies 
that the issue is equally urgent for all, but in practice, it can have an 
opposite effect: the idea of “globality” can be an excuse for inaction 
among developed countries, while it may underpin intervention in 
developing countries.  While deforestation in the Amazon rain forest is 
seen as a global concern, which other countries have a stake in; the same is 
not the case for forests in more developed countries  (Yearley, 2005:47).  
The “global” framework can also become a hindrance for effective policy 
action. Victor (2011) argues that the current climate change framework 
has become “gridlocked”. By focusing too much on an issue’s “global-
ness”, we may make it harder to implement, and the implementation may 
become insensitive to local concerns, uniqueness or hindrances. A bigger 
problem is that this creates a policy bottleneck when the global model and 
global understandings of climate change does not lead to the formulation 
of effective national policy responses. Universal, global efforts to mitigate 
climate change has been slow, and plagued with conflict and setbacks 
(Victor 2011:48). 
Understanding climate change as “global” may also create a fixation on 
global, one-off solutions, to be decided in pivotal international meetings. 
Victor urges us think of climate change as a development issue, not an 
environmental issue. “It isn’t so much a Manhattan project – a crash effort 
focused on a specific goal without regard to cost. It is more like economic 
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development – a slow, subtle process of profound social change” (Victor, 
2011:54). Similarly, North (2011) argues that  
Climate change and resource crises are urgent problems, 
but they are not problems that can be solved easily or 
quickly. There is no one point of pressure, passing a civil 
rights act, no decision not to deploy Cruise or Trident 
missiles, no decision not to invade Iraq that could have 
the same effect. No one demonstration could ever be seen 
to `succeed'. (North, 2011: pos 1569) 
A profound social change through a myriad of small, incremental 
decisions requires decisions on the national and local/municipal level, and 
inclusion and involvement of political actors on several levels, to be 
effective. Like most “global” issues, both the causes and the effects of 
climate change will still be tied to places.  
Steinberg and Vanderveer (2012) points out that the new kinds of 
environmental problem, which are increasingly global in nature, will still 
have to be addressed by specific movements and movement organizations 
within and across borders (Steinberg & Vanderveer 2012: pos 3100). On 
the governmental level, a process of “localization” of climate change is 
already underway. Governments in several countries have mandated 
municipal climate plans, both on issues of climate mitigation and –
adaptation, and made efforts to inform the public about the effects of 
climate change and the ways they can be mitigated or must be adapted to. 
My study largely concerns what role the environmental movement will 
take in this inevitable process of “localization”.  
1.3 What is the environmental movement?  
The environmental movement is a sprawling collection of organizations, 
evolved over more than a century, and containing different philosophies, 
courses of action and forms of organization. The core issue of 
environmentalism has been defined as changing the relationship between 
human society and the natural world, to halt or slow down environmental 
degradation. The impetus for local environmentalists may be the 
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experience of local pollution, loss of resources or wildlife, or a larger 
concern for the global environment and the future of our species (O'Neill 
2012: position 2809). O’Neill (2012) divides the current environmental 
movement into four general groups: Wilderness and species preservation, 
access to and use of natural resources, responding to industrial and 
technological risk, and communitarian green movements, all with different 
choice of strategy, philosophies and practices. Environmental movements 
may have several overlapping organizations that address one or more of 
these issues  (O'Neill, 2012 pos 2835-2840).  
Environmental movements have often been seen in light of social 
movement theory, derived from studies within sociology, political science 
and anthropology of the new social movements that emerged from the 60s 
onwards, such as civil rights (in the United States), radical feminism, gay 
rights and environmentalism. Social movements have been broadly 
defined as: 
Association or set of associations organized around a 
common interest that seeks to influence collective 
outcomes without obtaining authoritative offices of 
government (Dryzek et al.: pos 114-115). 
While connections may be drawn between these “social movements”, their 
sociological and political foundation and function, environmentalism has 
distinct features which sets it apart from the other social movements. 
Yearley (2005) delineates three central characteristics: claims for 
international solidarity, the movement’s intimate relationship to science, 
and the movement’s ability to offer a concerted critique of, and alternative 
to, capitalist industrialism. (Yearley 2005:24)  
Yearley (2005) relates the environmental movement’s focus on expertise 
to Max Weber’s classical analysis of social bases of authority: Traditional, 
charismatic and legal-rational. The environmental movement mainly use 
the latter, where claims to authority can be made “impersonally, on the 
basis of accepted and demonstrable principles. (Yearley 2005:118) This is 
an important insight when studying the environmental movement. The 
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Norwegian political scientist Stein Rokkan famously argued that “votes 
count, but resources decide” (Rokkan 1966). However, the environmental 
movement’s resources can be hard to quantify. As Asdal (2011) points out, 
scientific arguments is an especially important “resource” beyond the 
parliamentary and the corporate channels. “Through laboratory analysis, 
and quantified measures, a minority can still achieve political influence” 
(Asdal, 2011:30). This does not mean that resources are unimportant. 
Science can both change established policy, and create new laws or 
regulations, but is never enough on its own (ibid.).  
However, focusing on influence on national politics may cause us to miss 
important aspects of the environmental movement. NGOs may supplement 
other actors, including governmental institutions, the media, businesses, 
looser public movement and scientists, who play different roles in the 
political process. NGOs may be agents of change and social learning, by 
building movements, creating examples, mobilizing political pressure and 
facilitate “social learning”. They may create not just political shifts, but 
also cultural developments towards sustainability. (Doyle 2009:106)   
This does not entail a view of NGOs as an entirely separate actor. NGOs 
can be seen as part of what Dryzek (2003) describes as an “oppositional 
public sphere”, which is “not (…) an alternative to the state, but (…) a 
partner and opponent in historical interaction” (Dryzek et al. 2003 pos 
2907-2908). While earlier theorists, such as Stein Rokkan, view these 
spheres as emergent form of state politics, Dryzek argues that this 
historical interaction can also be studied as more permanent spheres of 
political action. “Civil society is not just a resting place for social 
movements on their way to the state” (Dryzek et al. pos 2897-3344). In 
short, the environmental movement play an important role in and of 
themselves, and their efforts to recruit and engage people in climate 
activism can be an important and long-lasting contribution to a broader 
social change that will involve all the actors mentioned above.  
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When environmentalists work together to achieve their political goals, 
they form movement organizations. Depending on the scope of the issue(s) 
they work with, they may be international, national or strictly local in 
scope. They may also choose to rely on mass mobilization or on 
centralized, professional work. The forms of activism are diverse, from 
production of scientific studies to civil disobedience, from lobbyism 
towards the central government to information campaigns aimed at the 
general population. The organizations or movements are usually studied 
within their national context, but may also be sorted by issue, such as the 
global climate movement, for example (O'Neill 2012: pos 2809-2824). To 
understand how the broader movement’s strategies are affected by climate 
change, I want to look at organizations that are both local, national and 
international in scope, which are at the core of their respective movements, 
and which rely on several forms of activism.  
1.4 The development of environmentalism  
Here, I will discuss the trajectory of the environmental movement in 
western countries. I will argue that the organizations have moved away 
from the participatory ideals of the 60s and 70s, and that this movement 
may impede current efforts to mobilize people on the issue of climate 
change. 
Throughout the environmental movement’s history, both old and new 
organizations have broadened the scope of their work, as science has 
unveiled new damaging consequences of capitalist industrialism.  This has 
in turn affected their choice of strategy, along with other factors. Several 
of the issues that the environmental movement approaches are 
counterintuitive, hard to observe or even unknowable without scientific 
monitoring. Expertise is needed to assess the biodiversity and vulnerability 
of natural habitats, the threatened status of a species, or the negative health 
effects of local pollution. The need for expertise is even bigger when it 
comes to “invisible” atmospheric pollution. The hole in the ozone layer, 
the causes of acid rain, the effects of chemicals in the ecosystem are all 
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issues that are only knowable through science. This strongly influences the 
strategies of the movement (Yearley, 2005:21).  
Theorists of environmental movements have broadly categorized their 
development in two large “waves”, brought forth boy by new issues and 
broader social and political changes. The first wave came with early 
organizations such as the American Sierra Club (founded in 1892), which 
was heavily influenced by the ideas of early 19th century American writers 
such as Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry Thoreau. These writers penned 
some of the first protests against the encroachments of industry upon the 
still virgin forests of the new world.  The movement was driven by natural 
scientists armed with new knowledge of the natural world, and resulted, 
among other things, in the conception and establishment of national parks, 
a trend that continues to this day  (Giddens 2009:51).  
The second large wave of environmentalism took shape in the 1960s 
and 70s, emerging in Germany, and connected to other “new social 
movement” issues (Giddens 2009:52).  It was inspired by both the political 
upheavals of the late 60s, new issues that required radically new ways of 
viewing the world, and new forms of political action. Rachel Carson’s The 
Silent Spring from (1962) described the emerging problem of chemical 
pollution, and its subtle damaging effects on nature and human health. Her 
book had a large effect on green ideology and forms of action. New issues 
also increased the scope of environmental activism. Publications such as 
Limits to Growth (1972) and The Population Bomb (1969) created a 
consciousness of global environmental problems. (Doherty 2006: 698) 
This increased the emphasis on international solidarity.   
In many countries, the environmental movement turned to mass 
mobilization and grassroots activism  (O'Neill 2012: pos 2855-2886). 
“Grassroots activities” refer to voluntary action in addition to meetings 
and other forms of formalized work through organizatons (Andersen. 
2004: 126). A central feature of the new social movements was that they 
provided a form of “social laboratories”, democratizing and disseminating 
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forms of knowledge production, and transforming them into action. 
Activists could take part in cooperative research, new forms of technology, 
participatory policymaking and assessment of technology (Eyerman & 
Jamison:71, 93). The second wave of the environmental movement saw 
green movement organizations performing different forms of “citizen 
science” in their opposition to capitalist and industrial development, by 
assessing the environmental and social consequences. The environmental 
movement involved members in social action, which made the local 
environmentalists central actors in combining cosmological and 
technological knowledge, forms of “cognitive praxis”. These activities 
included recycling, ecological agriculture, producing wind power 
(especially in the case of Denmark) and energy conservation (Jamison 
2006:56).  
Scientific discoveries from the 70s onwards increased the focus on 
global atmospheric pollution. Most important was the discovery of the 
ozone hole, acid rain and climate change. As Carson’s chemicals, these 
issues are qualitatively different from most previous environmental 
problems, not least because of the vast scope of both the causes and the 
effects in time and space. Today, climate change is one of our biggest 
known pollution problems, and the issue receives increasing attention from 
both governments and civil society (Victor, 2011:30).  
These issues also changed the structure of the environmental 
movement. It led to the establishment of international, professional 
organizations such as Greenpeace, but also by a marked centralization and 
professionalization of “first wave” organizations, which were increasingly 
seen as the “mainstream” of the environmental movement, having 
maintained their activities for decades (Jamison 2001:158). The “cognitive 
praxis” of the second wave was “more or less decomposed, or 
deconstructed”, and the movement’s knowledge and interests were 
transformed into professional expertise, and coopted into mainstream 
politics. In this process, the environmental movement became “insiders”, 
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and their modes of cognitive praxis became an institutionalized part of 
mainstream politics and business (Jamison 2006:56). The 
institutionalization of environmental sentiment in government, academia 
and business underpinned a professional and centralized organization 
structure in the environmental movement. As the “rebellious” ideas of the 
60s and 70s became mainstream, so did the organization. (Jamison 
2006:57) In addition, environmental movement organizations were 
included in decision-making and policy in several countries, which 
encouraged a centralized and professional structure (Rootes 1999:155) 
(Dryzek et al. 2003: pos 1419-1420). 
 Within the environmental movement, the “residual” regime from the 
second and first wave focused on the national and local, advocating action 
through “traditionalist resistance” and basing their activity on factual or 
lay forms of knowledge, and a sense of place or “rooting” in local 
communities (Jamison 2001:179).  
Current environmental politics has been categorized as a “politics of 
expertise”.  Reitan (2004) defines this as a political process characterized 
by “(…) the use of scientific arguments, the definition of issues in 
technical, non-political terms and by processes on the bureaucratic arena” 
(Reitan 2004:439).  Environmental policy is typically regulatory, 
especially in cases of pollution control, and concerned with reducing the 
damage from a set of persons on public commons. Such regulatory 
policies are “characterized by a large technical or scientific core in 
decision making, resulting in a dominant role being given to the 
professional bureaucracy” (Reitan 2004:439). The environmental 
movement has adapted to this form of policymaking. According to 
Jamison, the dominant, current regime, co-existing with the “residual”, 
focus on transnational forms of agency, performing their action through 
modes similar to “commercial brokerage” and base their activity on 
scientific or managerial types of knowledge, rooted in scientific discipline 
or skills (Jamison 2001:179).  
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The dominant and the residual regime are often at odds with each other, 
and this conflict has caused division within the environmental movement, 
especially between the central leadership and local activists (Dowie 
1996:173). Jamison (2001) envisions an emerging, potential new form of 
cognitive regime, involves a synthesis of the “residual” and “dominant”. 
This emerging regime would create action through “exemplary 
mobilization”, based on contextualized or situated knowledge, acquired 
through experience (Jamison 2001:179).  
Climate change is approached by organizations that may embody this 
development, struggling with the gap between “residual” and “dominant” 
regimes of sustainable development, perhaps on the road to synthesis. This 
synthesis could in turn be a “hybrid” between the local and the global, 
“what has termed local cosmopolitanism or global ecological citizenship” 
(Jamison 2001:180). Such a synthesis might be crucial if the 
environmental movement wants to maintain their strength. As Dowie 
(1996) argues, in an assessment of the future of the American 
environmental movement at the turn of the 20th century:  
… The mainstream organizations will not and should not 
disappear. A federal strategy and the three L’s – 
legislation, litigation and lobbying – will always be vital 
aspects of environmentalism. But they are only aspects. In 
the end, the value of mainstream organizations will be 
measured by how effectively they work with grassroots 
environmentalists (…) (Dowie, 1996:173).  
 
Such a development is especially interesting in the face of a “global” issue 
such as climate change, where such a “hybrid” approach would make it 
possible for the environmental movement to utilize both professional and 
grassroots participation. As the climate change issue rises on the agenda, 
and continues its gradual path from (or parallel to) international summits 
to concrete national and municipal policy the environmental movement’s 
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impact will rely on whether these cognitive regimes are aligned, or 
possibly how they collide.  
While new organizations have and will crop up, the existing 
environmental movement has started to pick up the torch. This process is 
likely to change the environmental movement (the old dog), as well as, 
possibly, the way the climate issue is conceptualized (the trick). The object 
of my study is in that sense both the organizations and the issue, and how 
they interact, adapt to each other and creates new spheres of environmental 
opposition. To narrow down my inquiry, I have chosen to focus on how 
established environmental movement organizations engage members and 
local chapters in climate change-related activism. 
2.0 Method   
2.1 Choice of cases 
To explore my research question, I needed an organization that is involved  
with climate change, and includes grassroots activities. Preferably an 
organization with a long history, which may embody the different 
“cognitive regimes” of the environmental movement. As I wanted to look 
at a Norwegian organization, I chose the Norwegian Society for the 
Conservation of Nature (Norges Naturvernforbund, or NNV from now 
on), which fills all criteria. To broaden my scope, I wanted to include 
another, similar organization. My choice was the The Danish Society for 
Nature Conservation (Danmarks Naturfredningsforening DN from now 
on), which shares several attributes with the Norwegian counterpart. The 
two conservation societies were founded only years apart (1911 and 1914), 
and share a very similar organizational structure. 
Variation is a key reason why I chose Denmark over Sweden, which also 
has a very similar organization to NNV. Denmark is both very similar, and 
very different from Norway. As I want to look at how climate change can 
be made local, I wanted to look at organizations operating in different 
forms of environmental surroundings. Denmark is small, densely 
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populated and flat, while Norway is large, sparsely populated and 
mountainous. In addition, I saw it as a strength that the Danish party-
political system is much more similar to the Norwegian, without a strong 
green party, as Sweden has. This makes the political context of the 
organizations I study more similar. The Danish and Norwegian 
Conservation Society offered variety that might allow me to observe 
broader trends, while being highly comparable. 
The organizations are representative because they are the largest 
environmental organizations within each country. They are both examples 
of a specific type of environmental organization that exists in several other 
countries. As such, they are representatives of larger phenomena (King 
et.al 1994:10).  My findings may be relevant to similar organizations of 
this nature, through “qualified generalization” (Andersen 1997:16).  The 
organizations are comparable because they are similar enough to warrant 
comparison, while being different enough not to render comparison 
superfluous. When it comes to case selection, comparison is most fruitful 
where there is variation in both circumstances and outcomes.  
There are some clear differences between the two organizations: Danish 
Conservation Society is more than six times bigger in terms of 
membership. In addition, NNV is more radical, as it is part of the “Friends 
of the Earth” network. As such, it may be closer politically to the Danish 
member of the Friends of the Earth network – NOAH. However, NOAH is 
a second-wave organization, founded in 1969. It has a different, less 
hierarchical structure than NNV and has not gone through the same 
transformations as DN. The latter is a fellow first-wave organization 
founded on the same principle as its Norwegian Conservation Society. 
NOAH also fills a slightly different niche, not encompassing the same 
span of activities as the two Conservation Societies do. As I will return to 
below, the difference in number of local chapters and activists is much 
lower than the number of members may suggest.  
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A fourth reason is ease of access. Both organizations have showed interest 
in my study, and have been very accommodating, volunteering 
information, allowing me to visit internal meetings, giving me tips on 
where to find more information, and answering my requests, both on the 
central and local level.   
2.2 Approaching the organizations 
There are different ways of studying environmental movements 
comparatively. O’Neill (2012) outlines three main threads of comparative 
environmental movement literature: 
1) Studies of the history, emergence, and varieties of environmental 
movements around e action, and their broad trajectories over time. 
2) Examinations of the movements themselves: the variables that explain 
their organizational form, their choice of tactics, their scope, their 
targets, and specific trajectories of movements and movement 
organizations.  
3) The actual impacts of environmental movements: goal attainment, 
effect on policy outcomes and possible contribution to broader political 
and societal transformations (O'Neill 2012: pos 2853-2859). All these 
topics can be illuminated by cross-national or comparative studies.  
As I study an ongoing process within my chosen environmental 
organizations, my study will neither fit the first or third thread, though an 
examination of the movements will of course also include historical 
perspectives. Of the three approaches, this thesis will be closest to 
O’Neills second thread. However, I will limit my inquiry to single 
organizations, ant not entire movements.   
This can be studied in many ways. We may construct general theories, and 
test them against a narrowly defined operationalization that may or may 
not yield results. This presupposes that we have a strong understanding of 
the way these movements operate. This may not presently be the case.  In 
a general review of theoretically driven classifications of environmental 
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movements, Yearley (2005) argues that none of them have succeeded to 
capture the essence of environmentalism. “Only an essentially descriptive 
definition of ‘social movements’ is acceptable” (Yearley 2005:15). I have 
chosen to follow this lead, studying, describing and exploring my two 
cases empirically to better understand the recent interaction between 
established environmental movement organizations and a new and 
complex issue.  
Choosing a case study method makes it easier to understand the 
complexity and unique characteristics of the two organizations (Ragin 
1987:3). I wish to understand the casual effects of differences I have 
uncovered in how members are activated in climate change, and what 
causes conflict and inertia in this process, and look at how the climate 
issue may be changing the organization.  Yin (1994) defines the case study 
as “an empirical exploration of a collection of phenomena in its natural 
context, where the division between the phenomenon and the context is 
unclear”.  Case studies can be used to answer “how and why”-questions  
(Yin 1994:20). My question relates to how the environmental movement 
can facilitate climate action.  In the study, I will describe relevant aspects 
of the historical and political context of the organizations, and the internal 
workings of the organization, to be able to explain the variations in the two 
organization’s ability to engage members in climate issues.  
The comparative components of study is based on the “difference method” 
where the similarity between the cases can be discarded as an explanation 
for their differences. (Moses & Knutsen 2007:97-98) Comparative studies 
between Scandinavian countries have been described in the literature on 
comparative politics as especially fitting examples of the use of the “most 
similar systems” design (Lijphart 1971:689). As my case study is not 
based on dichotomous variables, the method is not employed exactly as 
Mill prescribes. In practice, I will include comparison where it may 
strengthen the understanding of the two different cases. It is especially 
fruitful to uncover whether certain characteristics or developments are 
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common or unique to the organizations I am studying.  While I still base 
my study on the logic of the difference method, where the similarities in 
organizational history, structure and political framework makes it easier to 
sort out the explanatory factors that best explains the differences in my 
findings.  
A comparative perspective has much to offer environmental studies. 
Different countries largely struggle with the same problems in different 
political contexts, whether it is preservation of wilderness and 
biodiversity, pollution or climate change. In a broad sense, the 
environmental problems that plague modern societies can be seen as 
global independent variables that affects a large amount of countries and 
organizational structures. This is readily apparent in the structure of 
environmental organizations that share a curious mixture of local focus 
and global awareness. Tactics, ideas and strategies have long diffused 
across national borders (O’Neill  2012: pos 3134). 
To uncover interesting information by comparing organizations across 
borders involve two major analytical tasks: appreciate the inherent 
complexity of the subject, and use theoretical tools to make sense of it 
(Steinberg & Vanderveer 2012 pos 252-255). As detailed above, I have 
included a pluralistic theoretical framework to make sense of different 
aspects of my findings. While this study includes comparison, it is still 
more exploratory than comparative. I want to explore common and unique 
conditions for climate activism in the two countries. Instead of choosing a 
few, select variables to compare within the two organizations; I have 
aimed to get a breadth of information. Still, within my two case studies, I 
have chosen to focus on some factors that lend themselves best to a 
comparative perspective, mainly the local activist’s perception of the 
issue, and their self-image as activists and local experts.  
2.3 Primary sources  
I have chosen several sources to gather information about the two 
organizations, with a focus on interviews with the actors themselves. I 
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interviewed 40 people altogether, 16 in Denmark and 24 in Norway. 
Among my secondary sources are studies of the organizations. I have also 
looked at internal documents and report, and on the organization’s web 
pages. Using several sources of data to study the same phenomenon 
strengthens the validity of my data (Jick 1979:603). 
At the central office, I conducted longer (about one-hour) interviews with 
the president, the organizational secretary and the head climate advisor in 
both organizations, as well as members of the leadership or secretariat who 
worked with projects relevant to climate work. All in all, I interviewed six 
people at the central office in NNV, and five in DN. Two of the latter were 
interviewed over the phone.  
I chose not to include a survey, after doing preliminary research on the 
organizations. I performed the interviews with central leaders in NNV 
early on, including their leader, second in command, former general 
secretary, secretary of organization and head climate advisor. In addition, I 
made an early informal phone call to the general secretary of DN. I was 
advised that it would be hard to gather replies on written surveys to all 
local chapters (about 100 in each country). I also discovered that such a 
general survey would also easily miss its mark, simply because the number 
of local chapters working with climate change was relatively small.   For a 
large part of the responders, the questions would seem irrelevant or based 
on wrong assumptions. This made me worry that a general survey, 
possibly with a low response rate, would give me a non-representative or 
shallow view of the local activist’s ideas and activities.  
My compromise was to call representatives on the regional level, which 
had an overview of the activities of chapters. In Norway, each region has 
its own “regional chapter”, with members that are also members of local 
chapters in municipalities. In Denmark, local leaders gather in regional 
coordinating councils, which also has its own leadership. In other words, 
the respondents could answer for both their own local chapter and other 
chapters in the region. I one representative in each of the 18 regions in  
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Norway one in each of the 10 regional councils in Denmark, and 
conducted medium-length (20 to 60 minute) interviews based on a set of 
relatively open-ended questions, formulated both on the basis my 
theoretical framework and my interviews with the central actors. Not all of 
the questions yielded answers that I found use for in this text, but I have 
listed the questions in the appendix.   
The choice of regional representation comes at the cost of representation 
of the total member mass, as the regions are not evenly populated. I chose 
this form of representatively because there are large differences between 
the regions, especially in Norway. To avoid a large imbalance, I have at 
times given more weight to responses from leaders from the bigger 
regions.  
In addition, I talked to local activists with an especial interest in climate 
change, based on my interviews with the central leadership and secretariat. 
In Norway, this included the regional manager in Hordaland, and the 
leader of the Kristiansand chapter in Norway. These activists are also both 
part of the regional leadership, so I also interviewed them about the region 
in general. In Denmark, I travelled to a meeting of DN’s “Climate 
Network”, a platform where leaders from different local chapters with a 
special interest in climate change convene and share experiences and 
educate themselves further. I observed and recorded their meeting, as well 
as conducting a 1.5-hour interview with their leader. I also attended and 
recorded a meeting of the National Board in the Norwegian Conservation 
Society, where climate change was on the agenda. This meeting mainly 
consisted of people I had already interviewed over the phone.  
As the organizations are democratic, and open to internal disagreement, I 
did not see it necessary to make the respondents anonymous. In several 
cases, it would have been impossible, as the positions of different actors in 
the organizations are already well known. I e-mailed longer quotes to the 
respondents, to make sure that I had understood their answers correctly, 
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and that they were comfortable about having it in print. This did not lead 
to any significant changes in the quotes.  
Interviewing the regional leader, especially climate-conscious local 
activists and representatives of the central leadership and secretariat, 
provided a certain balance between depth and breadth of information. The 
regional leaders could give answers in their own words, and I was able to 
clear up possible misunderstandings in the way the questions were 
formulated. This also made it possible to adjust my questions so that the 
answers became more precise. In some cases, the interviews led me to 
contact new people, to get a better understanding of disagreements or 
internal discussions. This was the case for the Mejlflak controversy. As I 
was done with many of the interviews at an early stage, I was able to 
access more relevant information, a method that can strengthen studies 
where the researchers have a limited amount of previous knowledge (Tjora 
2010:91).  
The word “activist” is used frequently in this study. When I asked the local 
activists about the level of local activity, I defined it as being active at 
least once a month in activities connected to the organization’s goals. 
Many of these hold positions at the local levels, usually as members of the 
board of the local chapter. Environmental activism can be many things. It 
can be directed towards specific issues or general topics; it can be done 
through lobbyism, through informing the public, through petitions, 
protests or symbolic demonstrations. It can also take the form of activities 
such as excursions or practical work such as garbage collection or charting 
of local biological diversity. When asking members about their “activity” 
on the climate field, I asked them to include any such measures.  My 
interview questions have been informed by the study of effectiveness of 
local activism in the American Sierra Club, by Ganz et al (2004). 
In some chapters, I will go deeper into singular conflicts or discussions 
that offer especially good examples of different aspects of the 
organization’s local climate work.  
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2.4 Theoretical perspectives 
This study is mainly empirically based, and several of the key questions 
are derived from my findings, as much as from existing studies. In this 
kind of study, it is hard to draw a clear line between the theory and the 
material at hand. As Yearley (2005) argues:  
“There is (…) no single criterion allowing us to explain 
which pressure groups can be associated with a large-
scale social movement and which cannot; the reasons for 
mass participation have to be analyzed on a case-by-case 
basis” (Yearley 2005:15). 
In line with this, I have seen it necessary to apply a flexible approach, 
including several theoretical perspectives on my material. The different 
perspectives I employ have informed my questions during the 
explorations, defined the boundaries of my discussion, and aided my 
analysis. I have explored several of these approaches during my research, 
as my findings pointed me in new directions. In other words, I have tried 
to find theoretical approaches that may fit different parts of my study, and 
which may increase my understanding, or provide a framework for my 
discussions.  
As climate change is still a relatively new political issue, the vast majority 
of comparative studies have been written before the issue became central 
on the environmental movement’s agenda.  Several books on climate 
activism take the form of guides for future climate action (Isham & Waage 
2007, Monbiot 2007). Case studies of climate campaigns have been made 
on the movement level within countries, such as Hall and Taplin (2007), 
who look at the climate strategies of seven Australian environmental 
organizations, and North (2011) who charts forms of local climate 
activism in the UK.  
Still, studies of similar environmental organizations have been of great use 
to understand the general changes in the environmental movement the past 
decades. When discussing how these trends have affected climate change 
activism, I will use studies of the general development of the organizations 
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away from local activism and grassroots activities, such as Dryzek et al 
(2003), Bortne et al (2002) Rootes, (1999) , Læssøe (2007, 2008) and 
Jamison  (1991, 2001, 2006).  
To analyze the activist’s perception of climate change, I have included 
literature that help to interpret how the local activists “see” climate 
change. This exploration will depart from previous studies of how 
environmental problems have been “made visible”, and seen by local 
activists and pressure groups, and how local lay knowledge and 
perspectives has conflicted with “expert” knowledge in environmental 
conflicts. This is partly based on similar case studies, such as Syse (2001, 
2010) and Asdal (2011), as well of discussions of the effects of 
“globalizing” discourses, explored by Yearley (2005) and Tsing (2005). 
Here, I have also drawn on Bortne et al (2002), who have charted “unique” 
traits of the Norwegian environmental ideology.  
In the latter part of my study, I will go deeper into a discussion of 
environmental activism as knowledge production, drawing on Jamison and 
Eyerman (1991) who have charted environmental movements and their 
modes of “cognitive praxis”. This involves a look at a relationship that has 
long languished in the blind spot of several theoretical approaches to 
social phenomena. Classical paradigms such resource mobilization theory 
and new social movements theory have largely ignored the relationship 
between movements and scientific knowledge. Meanwhile, studies of 
science, technology and society has largely ignored the role of movement  
(Jamison 2006:46).    In the last part of my analysis, I will focus on how 
the local activist’s role as local experts can create tensions, conflict or 
traction when approaching the new issue.  I will look see these tensions in 
light of Jamison’s categorizations of “cognitive regimes” in the 
environmental movement. Here, I will also draw on Yearley’s (2005) 
study of British environmental movement organizations, and their 
relationship to science. 
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2.5 Methodical challenges  
Using only two cases and looking at a number of explanations makes it 
harder to generalize my findings. However, I believe a better 
understanding of these two cases, both their similarities and differences, 
may be of use in several other, similar cases. Of especial interest are the 
experiences and evaluations local activists present when discussing 
climate work. As I have argued, climate change policy is still 
predominantly a top-down affair, and continued “localization” may be 
easier through the use of this kind of case study. My main goal is to 
understand my cases, and the study is as such not a systematic attempt to 
disprove or develop theories. Instead of falsifying or verifying different 
explanations, I am using established literature to aid my interpretation, and 
identify important casual factors.  
A central question is whether the explanations I put forward, based on the 
interviews and secondary literature, is necessary and sufficient. An 
explanation is necessary if it must be present to explain an outcome, and 
sufficient if it alone can explain an outcome. (Ragin 1989: 100) To the 
latter end, my study may fall short. The complexity and interplay, of the 
different explanatory factors, which I aim to uncover, makes it hard to find 
any sufficient explanations. However, the comparison may uncover 
necessary explanations within the two cases, both among those who are 
shared, and those who are unique (Ragin, 1989:25). 
The political context is important to understand several of my findings. To 
account for this, I have studied the two organization’s history, and 
accounts of the history of the two countries’ environmental movements, as 
well as previous case studies and comparative studies of the organizations 
and/or the environmental movements they are part of. Based on this 
research, I have pointed out important differences in the organization’s 
historical and political context when these are apparent and relevant to 
understand certain differences, but I run the risk of missing important 
contextual differences.  
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By aiming for complexity, I do, to a certain degree, forfeit my ability to 
accurately check for other variables. There might very well be other 
explanations than those I focus on which may explain why the 
organizations are struggling with the involvement and recruitment of local 
activists in their climate work. The links between the different causes are 
complex within both organizations, and this makes it difficult to separate 
the different variables, which is a reason for choosing the case study 
method. In addition, comparison between the two cases makes it easier to 
identify developments or issues that are caused by underlying tensions 
based on cultural, geographical or political factors.  
Using interviews opens up several possibilities for several practical and 
methodological challenges. First, the phone interviews made the 
interviews less personal, and may have made it harder for several of the 
responders to understand my questions. However, I took care in repeating 
or clarifying when the answers seemed to be based on misunderstandings. 
Secondly, there was a slight language barrier with some Danish 
responders. I tried to counteract this by asking again if the answers seemed 
to miss the mark, or were unusually short. Thirdly, the responders may 
have understood my questions differently, and thus given slightly different 
answers.   
While most of the questions were relatively open, some of them might 
have been leading. The most loaded question I included, was whether the 
local activists saw climate change as something that conflicted with other 
issues the local activists worked with. My previous knowledge, research 
and early interviews with the central level indicated that this was a 
problem, and I saw it as important to chart how prevalent such notions 
were. Most activists readily answered this, and all were aware that such 
conflict existed in the organizations. Still, this question might have caused 
some of the interviews to be more focused on conflict than if I had omitted 
this question.  To make sure this did not color the whole interview, I asked 
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other, more general questions first. In practice, most of the activists that 
saw the issue as problematic mentioned this before I asked about it.  
Another challenge is that critical voices may be “louder” in my material. 
Local leaders who are critical to the climate change policy conducted by 
the central level are often more engaged, and have provided we with 
longer and more impassioned answers than many of those who were “on 
the fence” or positive to the issue and the organization’s work. On the one 
hand, this may skew my study to be more focused on these answers.  I 
have tried to counteract this by summarizing my findings in tables, 
codifying central answers to display the actual distribution local 
assessments. On the central level, I may also have chosen quotes that are 
more “interesting” – favoring those who point to differences or conflict 
within the organizations. This may create an impression that the 
differences are larger than they are. I have made an effort to avoid too 
“tabloid” quotes, and include modifying paragraphs or clauses. Still, I run 
the risk of amplifying certain quotes that may create a skewed image of 
the organizations. On the other hand, the instances of conflict are 
interesting finds, and may offer more information about central problems 
the organization faces.  
There is an imbalance in my data between the two organizations. This is a 
comparison between Norway and Denmark, conducted by a Norwegian, 
and it is almost inevitable that this will affect the study. I have a 
background in the Norwegian environmental movement through the youth 
organization of NNV, and therefore had more previous knowledge about 
the Norwegian case than the Danish one. In addition, I chose to interview 
more people in NNV than in the Danish counterpart. DN has 10 regions, 
while Norway has 18 (two of the 19 Norwegian regions are combined in 
the Conservation Society’s structure), and there is more variance between 
the Norwegian regions. This made it necessary to call more local leaders 
in Norway. Thus, I have a broader set of answers from the Norwegian 
organization. Still, I believe the combination of my ten interviews and my 
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talks with local activists during the meeting of the climate network has 
given me sufficient information about local activist’s point of view in the 
Danish case. With limited time and resources, I have settled for this 
imbalance.  
2.6 On my own role  
As mentioned, I have a background in the Norwegian environmental 
movement. From 2002 to 2010, I held different positions in Nature and 
Youth, the youth organization to NNV. I also performed my mandatory 
civil service in the environmental organization Bellona. I therefore run the 
risk that some of the informants knew about me from my previous 
involvement in the movement. One of my sources in Norway, Ingeborg 
Gjærum, was the leader of Nature and Youth during my work in the 
organization, and is a personal acquaintance. During my research, I 
applied for a job in NNV, and was hired in December of 2012, with an 
agreement to begin as soon as the thesis was completed. It is worth noting 
that the organization have expressed genuine interest in my findings, and 
expressed that critical comments are welcome. In addition, all the 
interviews but three was finished at the point of my employment and these 
were at the local level. Only one of the three remaining local leaders in 
Norway knew of the recruitment. 
My closeness to the central level in the Norwegian case has both negative 
and positive effects. On the one hand, my previous knowledge, both as a 
local activist and an employee at the central level has given me insight into 
the workings of the organizations. It has made it easier to gain access, and 
in some cases easier to get the respondents talking. The informants trusted 
me, and readily gave me new information. Having some previous 
knowledge about the practical workings of the organizations has aided the 
interviews, and made it easier to discern different stances and interpret the 
responses. However, it may also have given me blinders, and made it 
harder to analyze my findings objectively. A greater distance to the topic 
could also have been a strength during some of the interviews, giving me a 
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clearer role as a researcher. I have done my best to remain impartial and 
evaluate the organization through the eyes of a researcher, but it was hard 
to ensure that the interviews themselves were not impacted. This applies 
only to the interviews with the central actor in NNV, as I did not know any 
of the local representatives beforehand.  
My interest in the topic of this study was largely based my own 
background. This has affected my choice of research question, and also 
impacted where I have looked for answers, and what presumptions I had 
when approaching my sources. This can both be a weakness and a 
strength.  
3.0 The organizations   
Before delving deeper into the material, I want to give a summary of the 
organization’s structure, core policy, climate policy, and current economic 
priorities. This is an important backdrop to the following discussion. As 
we will see, the organizations are very similar, but their core goals, their 
structure, and the way they involve members in climate change, differ 
slightly. A large and active member mass is seen as very important in both 
organizations, but their current structure and priorities suggests that the 
climate issue has so far not strengthened this goal.  
First, we should take a brief look at the long histories of the two 
organizations. Traditions, alliances and experiences shape their strategy, 
and is an important background for their current approach to climate 
change.  
3.1 DN - a gentle giant  3 
Amicable relations to the government characterize the history Danish 
Society for the Conservation of Nature, but the organization has taken a 
more confrontational turn the past three decades. The organization was 
founded in 1911. It was, from its conception, more oriented towards nature 
                                              
3 Information primarily based on the The Danish Society for Conservation of nature 2011 - Web 
database  
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as a recreative and cultural resource than it’s Norwegian counterpart, 
advocating conservation for the people, not just for its own sake. (Jamison 
et al. 1990:74). The membership largely consisted of “artists, clerks, 
owners of large estates and academics”. In 1928, the organization 
established a committee of natural science, to strengthen DN’s scientific 
approach to nature preservation. The membership base also expanded, as 
the organization became national in 1925. Local chapters were established 
all over the country, and the membership base increased from around 
3.000 to 10.000 people. DN’s work was from an early age incorporated in 
public policy through channels of public participation. For example, 
several recreational areas around Copenhagen were preserved in 1936, by 
a public commission where Conservation Society was represented. In 
1937, a new nature preservation law included a clause which granted DN 
the right of suggesting public preservation projects in all of Denmark, a 
right which has not been granted in any other country, and which is still in 
effect. Between 1940 and 1970, efforts to increase employment and 
farmable area, often through the building of dams, caused large losses of 
nature in the form of fjords, lakes, marshes, watersheds, fields and other 
kinds of unfarmed land. This made the organization’s role more important 
in keeping these developments in check.  
In 1959, the independent youth organization Natur og Ungdom was 
founded. The youth organization has played a less important role than its 
Norwegian counterpart has.  The 60s also saw a change in strategy, 
towards more radical, ideological stances. The Conservation Society’s 
platform was developed towards a larger focus on environmental and 
societal issues. The mid 60s saw an increased effort to enlighten the 
populace in environmental matters. Lectures, study circles, films, 
appearances on TV and the radio were among the tools for the new 
“information committee”. In 1963, the organization championed a 
referendum to curb property rights to ease conservation efforts. The 
referendum was a crushing defeat, and the organization turned towards a 
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much more conciliatory attitude, ushering in new, more radical grassroots-
based organizations on the “green fringe”, most notably NOAH in 1969, 
and the Organization for Renewable Energy in 1975. (Jamison et al. 
1990:75)   
The shift toward broader environmental concerns was made explicit in a 
letter to the members in 1971, where the leader wrote that “the 
preservation efforts today include all our natural resources: air, water and 
earth”. A pollution committee was established in DN, three years before 
Denmark established a ministry of the environment, in 1974. The same 
year, Denmark joined the EU, something that was seen as a positive 
development DN as the EU has contributed to an increase in natural 
preservation efforts through directives. DN also started arranging outings, 
where members could experience nature together, and even established a 
travel agency for trips to foreign countries. From 70s onward, the 
organization increased their recruitment efforts, using telephone recruiters.  
DN started cooperating with other green organizations in 1983, through 
the “Green contact committee”, which consists of 14 member-based 
organizations. In 1984, there was a change in leadership. The new 
leadership launched new, offensive measures to increase the public 
awareness of not only nature preservation, but also broader environmental 
issues. The media became a more important channel of influence. In 1985, 
the term “Nature recovery” was launched. A national effort towards nature 
recovery was approved the same year. The organization could boast of 
225000 members at their 75 year-anniversary in 1986, around 5 percent of 
the total population.  
In the 1980s, DN became more radical.  The organization engaged itself in 
broader environmental problems, and the relationship towards both 
industry and agriculture turned from cool to outright antagonistic.  Climate 
change became more important in the 90s, especially with the 
Sustainability Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The organization also 
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broadened their program for popular enlightenment. A school service was 
also established in 1998. 
The generally amicable relationship with the national government cooled 
in the early 2000s, after the right-wing Fough Rasmussen administration 
took power, the Conservation Society lost the yearly financial support 
from the government, around 1, 2 million DKK. The right to propose 
public nature preservation projects was also disputed, but the proposal to 
remove this right was later pulled. A new way of activating members was 
developed through the yearly waste collection efforts which were 
pioneered by the local chapter on Vinderup in 2003, and have been 
arranged on a national basis since 2005. In 2010, 80.000 volunteers 
participated in the clean-up. 
DN have not been part of large political battles over climate change-
related issues. The organization has been part of the “92 group” – an 
umbrella organization working with climate change amongst other issues, 
and the organization has since 1992 also had “Local Agenda 21”-network, 
where climate is among the issues the members may work with. But the 
issue didn’t rise to the top of the agenda until 2006. According to current 
climate advisor Jens La Cour, the climate strategy was mainly based on 
lobbyism. In 2007, a climate network was established between the local 
chapters, and the same year, the Conservation Society started a campaign 
to pledge Danish Municipalities to become “Climate Municipalities”. The 
UNFCCC summit in Copenhagen in 2009 (COP 15) became a rallying 
point for climate change awareness for the Danish environmental 
movement, and the Conservation Society took part in arranging the large 
demonstration which accompanied the meeting.  
3.2 NNV – part of a tumultuous movement 4 
NNV’s history is marked by a higher level of conflict than the Danish 
counterpart, and much of their activity has been tied to broad movement 
mobilization against Norway’s energy sector. The first 50 years, NNV 
                                              
4 This overview is mainly based on Berntsen (2011), other sources are cited.  
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could be called a somewhat closed gentleman’s club, mainly concerned 
with issues of classical natural preservation. NNV was less concerned with 
access to nature than the Danish counterpart. This is likely tied to the fact 
that recreational uses of nature is addressed by the powerful Norwegian 
Trekking Organization, which has 240 000 members.5 The “competition” 
with this organization may also partly explain the lower number of 
members in NNV.  The organization was founded in 1914, as an offshoot 
of the Norwegian Geographical Society. The organization was founded to 
“inspire and maintain the people’s preference and interest for preserving 
the country’s nature, and collect the work to this end under a common 
leadership. During the first decades, the organization had a weak economy 
and small membership base. The organization was poorly received both 
among business owners, unions and among public officials.  The 
organization established a new, wider conception of nature preservation at 
their national summit in 1936, pointing out that the “Nature preservation is 
done on ethical, scientific, economic and social grounds”.  
After the war, the organization quickly regained influence through 
corporative channels. In 1947, the Conservation Society joined a new 
committee to draft a new law on nature preservation. The 60s marked a 
shift in the organization.  Landsforbundet (as it was called), had only a 
thousand members and five local chapters. Still, the organization was 
involved in most issues of nature preservation. In 1962, at an extraordinary 
yearly summit, the Conservation Society renewed their founding rules, and 
changed into their current name. Eight local chapters were attending the 
following national summit, and the organization adopted a wider 
conception of nature and nature preservation, referring to the “great web of 
nature”. NNV grew in membership. The member magazine Norsk Natur 
was published in 1965.6 The more action-oriented independent youth 
organization Nature and Youth (Natur og Ungdom) was officially created 
in 1967, and experienced a large increase in membership from 1971. The 
                                              
5 Den Norske Turistforning, Yearly Report 2011 
6 The Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature 2012 (a) Web page 
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new member-based organization “The Future in Our Hands” reached 
widespread support, championing a more fundamental criticism of modern 
industrialized society.  
The 70s has been called the Norwegian “green decade”. The Conservation 
Society was not a radical organization, but became more critical to the 
government through the 70s, especially on the issues of oil spills, acid rain 
and the development of hydro power in the Norwegian mountains. The 
battle for the Mardøla waterfall in 1970 has been identified as a watershed 
moment, where large popular support was mustered against a controversial 
hydro project. A new organization under the name of   “the coordination 
group for the protection of nature and the environment” (SNM, now 
defunct), was established in 1969. The protests included several local 
inhabitants without strong connections to the broader environmental 
movement.  NNV did not support the civil disobedience employed by 
(SNM), but supported the cause. The pattern from Mardøla, where looser 
coalitions are formed to include several interests (local, sectoral, 
ideological) under the same banner, is apparent in several of the large 
political struggles of the Norwegian environmental movement.  
A major conduit for new countercultural ideas were the successful populist 
mobilization against EU membership leading into the 1972 election, but 
NNV did not take an active stance. On the question of membership in the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), NNV was clear in their opposition. 
The issue raised strong popular support. The Conservation Society lobbied 
for an increased governmental acknowledgement of nature and resource 
preservation as an overriding concern in society, with its own ministry. 
The Ministry of the Environment was established in 1972. While 
strengthening the cause of environmental protection, it did not include 
some of the more radical ideas of a “national resource budget”, which had 
been part of the discussion.  The Conservation Society also warned against 
the dangers of global warming as early as 1976.  The final large struggle 
of the Norwegian “green decade” was the fight over the Alta River in the 
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north of Norway in 1979-80. Here as well as the previous struggles, a 
general action group was formed. The People’s Action applied the use of 
civil disobedience from 1979. The Conservation Society stuck to judicial 
means. The protests and the legal battle were ultimately unsuccessful. In 
the following years, NNV saw their membership dwindle, and maintained 
their work against hydro power through lobbyism.   
The blossoming oil industry also attracted the attention of the 
environmental movement in the late seventies and early eighties. The first 
large oil spill, on the Ekofisk oil field in 1977 increased their concerns. 
Despite large efforts to mobilize protests, the environmental movement 
was defeated in their struggle against oil exploration north of the 62nd 
parallel. After the defeats against Alta and the oil industry, followed a 
downturn in membership for the organizatoin.  
The tides turned again in the second half of the 80s, connected to the 
increased awareness of new, global environmental issues such as climate 
change, global loss of biodiversity, the hole in the Ozone layer, the 
Chernobyl disaster and acid rain. Several of the new, increasingly global 
environmental concerns were voiced in the 1987 “Brundtland Report”. 
The Conservation Society was growing again, and the new organization 
Bellona was established, as a more activism-oriented offshoot of Natur og 
Ungdom, mainly working against industrial pollution. The new wave of 
environmental consciousness had a marked effect on the 1989 elections. 
The Conservation Society also attended the Rio conference in 1992, at the 
massive NGO-based “Global forum”. The organization reached a popular 
peak in 1991, with 40.000 members.  
During the 90s, climate change became an increasingly important issue for 
the Norwegian environmental movement. One conduit for this engagement 
was the battle against methane-powered power stations in the late 90s. 
During the last decade, gas power and oil drilling has been some of the 
most contentious climate-related issues on the environmental movement’s 
agenda. The non-member based, environmental NGO Zero was founded as 
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another offshoot of Nature and Youth in 2002, and has mainly focused on 
climate issues. The Conservation Society has played an important part, 
through “People’s actions” and through their own work. The issue rose to 
the top of the agenda around 2004, according to the president Lars 
Haltbrekken. Two important national policies has since successfully been 
championed by the Conservation Society: the “climate deal” between all 
the political parties except the populist right party, initiated in 2007, and 
the government’s ongoing efforts to co-sponsor rain forest preservation in 
developing countries. (Reinertsen & Asdal 2010:45)  
According to both former managing director Jan-Thomas Odegard and 
present organizational secretary Steinar Alsos, the organization has stood 
on shaky economic grounds the past decades. In 1997, the organization 
was near bankruptcy, and almost going bankrupt. In 2007, the organization 
also struggled with the finances, and the economic troubles hampered the 
organization’s work for several years, but mainly at the central level. 
Alsos argued that this had reduced the organization’s ability to catch the 
wave of popular sentiment over climate issues in this period.  
3.3 Structure  
The focus of this study is the organization’s grassroots activities in climate 
change. I will here provide a short review of the organization’s democratic 
structure, and which channels of activity the organizations offer their 
members.  Members are involved in the organization’s work in two ways: 
directly, as part of local or national activism, and indirectly through 
democratic channels, which gives them a say in the organizations’ policies 
and priorities.  
DN has around 135 000 members, 1600 volunteers and 65 employees. The 
non-active members are sometimes called “supporting members”. The 
work of the organization is done through 98 local chapters, ten regional 
“coordinating councils, networks, student chapters, the “board of 
representatives”, the commission, scientific committees and the secretariat. 
The youth organization “Nature and Youth” has about 1000 members, and 
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are fully independent from DN. The combination of a strong central office 
and a strong local presence is an important part of the organization’s 
identity.  
Without the local chapters, we would lose our grounding, 
and our political legitimacy towards the government. 
Without the central office, we would be 98 isolated local 
groups with a limited influence locally, and no influence 
nationally (…) this is the nerve and the soul of the 
Conservation Society, our organizational trump card 7 
 
DN has a strongly democratic structure. The organization prioritize their 
work through a yearly “activity plan”, decided on through a democratic 
process, and decided in the board of representatives, with members from 
all chapters. The national work is mainly based on lobbying the 
government. Local chapters represent all members, passive and active, in 
their municipality. All chapters have a board. The size of the board is 
determined by the amount of members. These boards are elected for one or 
three year terms. The “local activists” include the local chapter boards, 
supplemental board members and other active members involved in local 
work groups. While “active members” previously pledged to be active for 
three years or more, this category has become more flexible. People who 
want to participate in one-off activities such as garbage collection in 
natural habitats, are called “volunteers”, but the terms are used 
interchangeably. None of these one-off actions has so far concerned 
climate change. 
The networks are loose national coalitions of active members from 
different chapters who share a special interest in one issue. The ten 
regional councils consists of local leaders and board members who 
participate within the region, and coordinate the local work, arrange 
seminars, appoint the organization’s representatives to regional councils 
and commissions. The Student chapters are regional congregations of 
                                              
7 Peter Mellergaard (a)   
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active student members. The Board of Representatives is the highest 
authority in the organization. It gathers about 240 representatives from the 
local chapters, fifteen personal members, 10 representatives from the 
student boards and five representatives from networks, and the members 
of the commission. The commission (forrætningsudvalget) has 11 
members, including a president and vice president. They are elected by the 
board of representatives and constitute the political leadership.  The 
scientific commissions are chosen by the commission, and consist of 
people with special expertise on key issues. They give advice to the 
sencretariat and political leaderhip. The Secretariat are the paid members, 
who perform most of the practical work of the organization at the national 
level.8 DN is in the process of reviewing their democratic structure.    
NNV is smaller in size, and does not have a complete coverage of 
Norway’s municipalities. The organization has about 20 000 members. 
The members are important, and described as the “backbone of the 
organization”. 9 The work of the organization is done through around 100 
local and regional chapters, the board of representatives (national board), 
the central board, scientific councils and a secretariat. Some local chapters 
cover more than one of Norway’s 428 municipalities. The regional 
chapters cover issues relating to the Norwegian regional governmental 
level “fylke”. There are 18 regional chapters, and 19 governmental 
regions, as there is one regional chapter covering the regions Oslo and 
Akershus. The national board includes one representative from every 
regional chapter, the central board, two representatives from Nature and 
Youth, one representatives from the children’s organization 
“Miljøagentene”, one from the secretariat and one from the Rain Forest 
Fund.10 The latter is one of two separate organizations which was created 
on the initiative of the Conservation Society: “Green living”, which is an 
umbrella organization promoting environmentalism in households and the 
                                              
8 Peter  Melergaard (a)  
9 Based on The Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature 2012 (b) Web resource 
10 This and the rest of this paragraph is based on The Norwegian Society for the Conservation of 
Nature 2012 (c) Founding clauses.  
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Rain Forest Fund, which works with rain forest and development projects 
abroad. Both are primarily funded by the government. None of these 
organizations have their own member base 
The central board consists of the leader and second in command, as well as 
three representatives elected by the Yearly Meeting. The Yearly Meeting 
consists of the national board, representatives from the local and regional 
chapters, Nature and Youth and Miljøagentene. The local chapters and the 
independent youth organization Nature and Youth are proportionally 
represented according to size. The members of the Nature and Youth 
(around 7000), are also counted as “youth members”, but not counted as 
ordinary members in the Conservation Society. In addition, companies, 
organizations and institutions can become «supporting members».   Both 
organizations allow individuals, organizations, companies and institutions 
as members, though only “personal members” are allowed positions in the 
organization. The Yearly Meeting decide upon the «work program», 
which outline the policy and priorities for all levels of the organization. 
While this program is meant to ensure democratic control over the central 
level, the secretariat and central leadership has at times been lackadaisical 
in following the program, according to former managing director Jan-
Thomas Odegard. The past years, the democratic structure has been 
strengthened.   
As we can see, members are involved in the organization’s work both 
directly and indirectly. The direct involvement mainly happens in local 
chapters, regional chapters and, in the Danish case, the networks. In this 
thesis, I will focus on direct involvement in climate change, and not on the 
indirect involvement in the central level’s work through democratic 
structures.   
3.4 Core goals 
The two organizations have slightly different core goals. The main 
documents of both organizations are their «founding clauses», where the 
purpose and rules of the organizations are formulated. The Norwegian 
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Society for the Conservation of Nature lines up an ambitious goal in its 
first point, the purpose of the organization.  
[NNV] will work for nature preservation and for securing the living 
environment so that human activity will not surpass nature’s limits. 
[NNV] will work for a society where humankind lives in harmony 
with nature. This is a society where the conditions and diversity of 
life is secured for future generations, and where the intrinsic value 
of nature is the basis for the work for increasing human respect for, 
and love to, life and landscape.11 
The Danish Conservation Society’s purpose is similar, but slightly 
different. The first “overarching and long-term goal” is that “Denmark 
becomes a sustainable society with a beautiful and varied landscape, a rich 
and diverse nature, and a clean and healthy environment”. The 
organization is more oriented towards nature as an area of recreation. The 
“public access to good experiences in nature” is mentioned as the second 
main goal. Further main goals and objectives are outlined briefly under the 
headings “Nature preservation”, “Environmental preservation”, 
“Planning”, “Access to nature”, “Legislation” and “Enlightenment”.12   
As we can see, both organizations have broad goals, including the general 
sustainability of their respective countries. DN is more concerned with 
recreational use of nature than the Norwegian Counterpart.  
3.5 Conceptualization of climate change  
Here, I will briefly account for how the two organizations frame climate 
change, and how they approach the issue in their official documents. The 
two organizations have both ramped up their climate change-related 
activity the past years. However, according to the president Ella-Maria 
Bisschop-Larsen and her colleagues at the central office,  DN has been 
more hesitant to the issue, and does not prioritize the issue as much as the 
Norwegian counterpart. A look at the two organization’s activity plans 
                                              
11 The Norwegian Society the Conservation of Nature (2011) Activity plan    
12 The Danish Society for Nature Conservation (2012 a) Founding Clauses 
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also show that the organizations include the issues in slightly different 
ways. In DN, climate activism is mainly seen as an extension of existing 
work to preserve nature for nature’s and people’s sake. In NNV, 
international solidarity is given more emphasis, and climate change is 
connected to global justice and human welfare.  
DN’s activity plan for 2013 states in an introductory paragraph that 
climate change is among the most important challenges for nature and the 
environment in the coming years, along with excessive fertilization, 
chemical pollutants, ‘fragmentation and lack of care’ [of wild nature], 
unrestrained use of resources, and the pressure on nature and landscape. 
Their main efforts on climate change are concentrated on climate 
adaptation, lobbyism towards the national government and a national 
campaign that pledges Danish Municipalities to reduce the climate 
emissions from municipal activities. The two latter are in the 
organization’s activity plan for 2013 sorted under “national” work. Only 
the climate adaptation work sorts under “local” activities. On their web 
pages, which includes its own section on climate change, DN only 
mentions the potential damage to nature. “Climate change is an enormous 
challenge for nature in Denmark, and in the rest of the world”. Under the 
slogan “strengthen the climate locally”, the organization underlines that 
this is an issue that should be solved locally, both as a means of mitigation 
and adaptation.13 
 “In DN, we believe that the climate problems should be 
handled locally, to give Danish nature the best 
circumstances – and at the same time reduce the global 
climate challenges”.14  
The organization has outlined the means to this end in two comprehensive 
reports, one on climate adaptation, and the other on energy, focusing on 
                                              
13 The Danish Society for Nature Conservation (2013) Activity plan  
14 Ibid. 
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the need of making Danish energy production 100 % renewable within 
2040, while minimizing the destruction of nature. 15 
NNV includes climate change as one of their three central issues in the 
period 2012/2013, along with organization building and nature 
preservation. While the Danish counterpart makes nature the main goal of 
climate activism, NNV frame this as a complementary goal, arguing for 
“showing the connection between climate emissions in the energy- and 
transport sector and the preservation of biodiversity”. The activity plan 
includes extensive points on climate change, including national, 
international and local efforts. 16  On the organization’s web pages, the 
effects on international biodiversity is mentioned along with the effects on 
people in developing countries. “[within 2020] 200 million Africans are 
very likely to lack water” (The Norwegian Conservation Society, 2013) 
The organization wants to reduce climate emissions in Norway by 40 
percent from 1990-levels within 2020, and towards zero in 2050. Three 
central means is to restrict the oil industry’s explorations in vulnerable 
areas, reducing energy consumption, and stopping the development of 
highways. 17  
The Conservation Society is more internationally oriented, with a heavy 
emphasis on Norway’s role in the UNFCCC process. The organization has 
had one representative in the Norwegian Delegation at all major meetings 
the past four years. They have launched three recent reports, one 
translation of Friends of the Earth’s “Climate Gambling”, published in 
2011, one on international climate negotiations, also 2011, and one on 
green energy and climate-friendly industry, in 2010. In addition, the 
organization spends large efforts combatting oil drilling through the 
“People’s Action For an Oil-Free Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja”.  
As we can see, the Norwegian organization is at first glance more heavily 
involved in climate change than the Danish counterpart, and includes a 
                                              
15 The Danish Society for Nature Conservation (2009, 2010) Reports  
16 The Norwegian Society the Conservation of Nature (2011) activity plan  
17 The Norwegian Society the Conservation of Nature (2012 d) Web resource 
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more international and anthropocentric assessment of the issue. The 
Danish organization puts a stronger emphasis on local activity. This 
impression may be impacted by the differences in size. The Danish 
organization is six times larger in terms of members, and spans a larger 
amount of issues. As mentioned above, NNV has also largely 
“outsourced” certain areas of their work, most notably environmentalism 
on the home front and through consumption, in the external organization 
“Green living”.   
3.6 Budgetary priorities  
While the framing of the issue is important, it tells us little of how 
important or extensive the issue really is to the organizations. A better 
indicator is the organizations’ budgetary priorities. Here, I will have 
included key numbers relating to local climate change work. The sums are 
presented in the nation’s currencies, which are at the time of writing 
approximately equal in value. Both are based on the organization’s most 
recent yearly reports18.  
 Norway (NOK) Denmark (DKK) 
   
Total expenses 46000000 76000000 
Funds from members 4 377 532 (~10 %) 63 976 000 (~84 %) 
Funds from government 29 668 234 (~64% of 
total income) 
5 055 00019 (~6% of total income) 
Funds for climate work 10 334 732 1 073 000 
  
There are very big differences in the amount of money the 
organizations spend on climate work. NNV spends nearly ten times more 
money on climate work at the central level than their Danish counterpart 
does. Almost a fourth of their budget goes to this issue alone. DN spent 
                                              
18 The Norwegian Society the Conservation of Nature (2012 e) Yearly Report 2011, The Danish 
Society for Nature Conservation (2012 b) Yearly Report 2011  
19 Project based, the organization does not receive general financial support.  
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only slightly above one million, less than a seventh of their budget. Of 
these funds, 516 000 went to the “climate municipality” project, and 
557 000 went to general climate lobbyism. In Norway, climate change 
takes up much more of the organization’s funding, and most of these funds 
are spent at the central level.  
As we can see, the two organizations vary greatly in the way they accrue 
funding. While the Danish organization receive almost all their funding 
directly from their member mass, the Norwegian counterpart relies heavily 
on government funds. In general, the governmental funding increases the 
Norwegian organization’s economic muscle relative to their Danish 
counterpart. While DN is roughly 6.6 times larger than NNV in terms of 
member mass, their budget is only 40 percent larger. It is important to note 
that the Norwegian government’s funding is partly calculated based on 
member size, and the number of regional and local chapters. The 
organization received about 7.3 million in general support from the 
Ministry of the Environment in 2012, based on these criteria.20 Even if we 
count this as member-based funding, the Norwegian organization gains a 
lower portion of their funding from members. 
It would be hard to get any of my respondents to gauge how important 
members and local activity really is for the organization. The central level 
is obliged to say that the local chapters and local activity is important, and 
local representatives obviously see themselves as important for the 
organization. Again, the numbers are a good indication.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
20 The Norwegian Ministry of the Environment , (2012)  
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 Norway (NOK) Denmark (DKK) 
Funds for local work 2 800 000 (~6% of 
total expenses) 
7 400 000 (~10% of total expenses) 
Members  20 118 133 118 
Local chapters 100 98 
Activists 608-70521 1600 
Funds per local chapter 28000 75510 
Funds per activist 3971 4625 
 
As we can see, DN has a much smaller ratio of local chapters and activists 
to members than Norway. This can be explained by the organization’s 
economical and political context:  
Members are important for the organizations for at least three reasons: 
their local activism helps fulfill the organization’s goal, a large amount of 
members strengthens the legitimacy of the organization, and they provide 
the organizations with funds through paying a yearly membership fee.  DN 
receive 84 % of their funds from membership fees. This makes recruitment 
crucial, but the level of activity is less important. The organization 
employs a staff of telephone recruiters who calls all Danish households on 
a regular interval.  
In the Norwegian case, the government gives more money to organizations 
that have internal democracy and a local presence. These incentives have 
affected the strategy of NNV, where there have been “a tendency to show 
some cynicism in choice of organizational form, simply to increase 
government support” (Bortne et al. 2002:119-120). In other words, the 
funding gives incentives to increase internal democracy and local 
presence. This form of funding makes activation of members (through 
maintaining local chapters, at the very least) more financially important to 
                                              
21 based on local leader’s assessments 
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NNV. Still, the organization spend fewer resources on membership 
activation than work on the central level, and less resources per activist 
than its Danish counterpart does. Unlike DN, NNV does not employ 
professional recruiters. Members and staff recruit new people on a 
voluntary basis.  
A larger portion of the Danish organization’s funds are directed 
towards the local level. These numbers are hard to calculate, as much of 
the secretariat’s funds in both organizations goes to following up local 
work.  We also see that DN spend more money on local work per activist 
and local chapters. It is worth noting that several of the Norwegian local 
and regional chapters receive direct funding for activities from the 
government, through several channels. For example, the Buskerud chapter 
receives funds for local environmental work from the Norwegian regional 
government. Erling Solvang in Nordland, Steinar Nygard in Sør-Trøndelag 
and Torleif Jakobsen in Sogn og Fjordane also pointed out that they get 
assistance from regional government-funded coordinating councils.   
The Norwegian organization also have more active members as 
measured as a portion of the total membership. The Norwegian tally  of 
activists may be more generous than the Danish one. The former is based 
on the local leader’s assessment of how many members that are active at 
least monthly with the local chapter’s work, which they were asked for 
during my interviews.  The latter is based on official accounts of the 
leadership in the local chapters, which I was referred to when I asked 
Danish local leaders about the number of local activists in their region. 
Still, the Danish tally is also supposed to include members that are active 
without holding local positions in the organization. If these numbers are 
correct, DN seems to spend more money per activist, both in total and as a 
portion of their budget, indicating that the organization is less “top-heavy” 
and centralized  than the Norwegian counterpart.   
The policy frameworks of the two countries, which springs out of the 
geographical and economic differences between Norway and Denmark, 
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may explain this difference. Denmark has, since the 70s, been an outlier 
among the Nordic countries, by favoring a decentralized environmental 
policy framework, where municipalities were responsible for issuing 
permits and inspecting and controlling local pollution. This is tied to the 
country’s economic composition as an agricultural, densely populated 
country with mostly small to middle-sized industries. In Norway, which is 
sparsely populated and harbors a strong oil sector, the central 
administration was more dominant until the late 80s, and still has more 
centralized features than the Danish administration (Joas 1999:144-150) 
(Andersen 1997:261). 
Here, I have shown and compared key aspects of the organizations, and 
their core activity. We have seen that the organizations have different 
membership, but are more similar when it comes to number of activists 
and available resources. We have also seen that the Norwegian 
Conservation Society is much stronger involved with climate change. But 
political goals, principles, and budgetary numbers does not tell us enough, 
especially in organizations based on voluntary effort. Local activists may 
do more or less activism than the numbers suggest. In a broad study of the 
American Sierra Club, Marshall Ganz argues that the development of local 
leadership and facilitations of local activities is one of the most important 
factors explaining organizational effectiveness. “The principal determinant 
of public influence is not what the organization has in terms of resources 
or context, but instead what the organization does with what it has” (Ganz, 
et al 2006:1). 
4.0 The central level’s vision of climate change  
One venue of climate activism are campaigns or programs initiated by the 
central level, which includes local chapters or members. Here, I will look 
at how the central level assess the engagement of local activists, and what 
kind of programs or campaigns that have been initiated, related to climate 
change. Their structure, and the form of activism they offer, is an 
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important indication of what kind of activism the adoption of climate 
change mitigation and adaptation has engendered in the organization. 
4.1 Local climate activity as an unpopular product  
The central level in both organizations see themselves as important 
facilitators of local action, and in some cases describe activities as a 
“product” that they can provide their members with. This is in line with 
previous observations about the Norwegian civil society. The relation 
between organization and members has been described as having “clear 
parallels to the elusive connection between consumer and producer in a 
market”.  This entails a break between politics at the local and the national 
level, between the individual and the political system (NOU 2003: 23-24).  
My interviews with leaders at the central level supported this description.  
The Danish example is most striking. During a visit in the central offices 
in Masnøegade in Copenhagen, I was waiting in a meeting room for an 
interview. Along the walls hung small posters where the secretariat had 
written up statements about the organization’s strategy. Two of the 
statements concerned the role of their members, and pointed to an idea of 
members as “consumers” of climate action. I have preserved the phrasing 
and use of parentheses. 
Our organization lack a home for active members that 
does not want to be part of the leadership of a local 
chapter. (or network!?)”, “DNs members are extremely 
wise – our products should be differentiated 
 
The members are seen as highly competent people, but also as a form of 
customers, buying “products” which should ideally be “differentiated”. 
This may entail offering new forms of activity besides participation in the 
leadership of local chapters and networks. The statement about local 
chapters and networks points to a perceived weakening of the traditional 
organizational structure. The members are wise, but there is a challenge in 
giving them activities (“products”) that they want to be part of (“buy”).  
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The feeling that members are largely uninterested in their current products 
is a source of frustration. Among some members of the central secretariat, 
the conclusion was that production should stop, and climate change be 
prioritized less. The organizational secretary Nick Leyssac was not 
optimistic:  
Personally, I think that this [climate change] is one of the 
issues that we should not have prioritized as much as 
we’ve done. I am probably opposed to what Jens (La 
Cour) says. Of course it’s something that is in the focus of 
the general public, but I think that our organization would 
be better off focusing on some other core issues. Because 
it takes focus from all the other tasks. But that is one of 
the prices that you pay when you broaden your 
perspective, not just change, but broaden. The 
consequence is more staff, but also less focus on the 
single issues.   
 
A main reason for this line of thinking was that the climate issue could not 
be worked with locally as effectively as traditional issues of nature 
preservation.   
Whenever we do work with an issue, we should think 
“what is the local angle on this?” and “what are the 
logical activities?”. One of the problems on climate work 
is that the local activities, the ‘hands on’ that you and I 
can do, are so...it must be a top-down change. The 
bottom-up activities is...I haven’t seen many examples in 
our organizations. 
 
Leyssac did not see any obvious ways of activating the members on 
climate change 
When I go to a local chapter and say ‘you should work 
with climate change, you should do this and this and that’, 
I can’t see the engaging activity that will bring in a lot of 
new volunteers.  
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According to Leyssac, the transformation of DN to an actor in climate 
policy was akin to “teaching an old dog new tricks”.  
In Norway, the organizational secretary and the climate advisor both 
argued along similar lines. In the view of the secretariat, the main reason 
for the relative lack of local involvement on climate-related issues is that 
they simply do not engage the local chapters. This has a large effect, as 
local autonomy is seen as important.   
The Secretariat of NNV also saw it as difficult to involve their members in 
climate work. When they sent out “packets” of flyers, questions for 
politicians or similar joint actions, the response was meager, according to 
the leader of the climate division, Holger Schaupitz. “We have to accept 
that 95 percent does nothing, but it’s very nice to hear from the five 
percent that do something”. One exception was a national action where 
local chapters were asked to light bonfires to mark opposition to the 
opening the Arctic areas of Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja for oil 
exploration. This climate-related action was joined by several local 
chapters. Still, the climate section saw it as difficult to involve local 
activists.  
Another source of frustration was the difficulties of mobilizing 
opposition to Norway’s powerful oil industry. While the organization 
reached many with their campaign against oil drilling in the 1970s, the 
issue has since been sidetracked until relatively recently. According to 
former managing director Jan Thomas Odegard, it is hard even to start 
discussing oil among the grassroots of the organization. “The whole 
country is intoxicated by oil”.  He pointed out that even radical 
organizations such as Natur og Ungdom find it necessary to publicly 
recognize service to the economic benefits of the oil. “Directly opposing 
our most important industry is a non-starter.”    For the newer members of 
central leadership, such as vice president Ingeborg Gjærum, raising 
awareness and increasing activity on the issue of oil was paramount.  
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While the environmental movement has increased their efforts against oil 
drilling, the efforts were far from satisfying. 
(…) Norwegian environmentalists, what a bunch of 
weaklings! I mean...we earn our living of shit (...) and we 
just quietly accept…how is that possible? Why isn’t there 
a war, you know, about how this country should earn a 
living?   
 
As we can see, the central office is frustrated with the level of activism at 
the local level, especially when it comes to climate change-related issues. 
Their relationship to the organization’s members seem to be in tune with 
Jamisons (2001) categorization of the dominant cognitive regime of 
sustainable development, sometimes labelled as “ecological 
modernization”. Within this dominant regime: “Participation is mainly 
conceived as top-down, with members of the public with the role of 
environmentally conscious consumer, or offered opportunities for 
ecological employment” (Jamison 2001:179). This points forward to a 
central question concerning the issue at hand. Why are the organizations 
struggling to create and “sell” new “products” in forms of climate-related 
activities, and why do they not produce activities on their own?  
4.2 Denmark: Climate Municipalities  
To explore this question, I have chosen to focus on two of the most 
important climate-related programs in the two countries. In DN, the 
“Climate municipality”-project represents a relatively top-down effort to 
include members.  According to project coordinator Jens La Cour, this 
project was initiated by the central secretariat in 2006.  They lobbied the 
political leadership to initiate a lobbying campaign. A stated goal was to 
utilize the 96 local chapter, to “do something that other organizations don’t 
do”. This meant forgoing other options, such as giving climate advice to 
citizens, which several other actors were already doing, including the 
government. According to La Cour, the secretariat was wary of “forcing” 
any program onto the local chapters, figuring that this would soon be a 
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fiasco, because the local chapters will not be dictated. They therefore 
chose to present the climate municipality program as an “option”.   
The secretariat and the president of the organization contact the local 
municipalities, and create a deal with them, where the municipality 
pledges to cut their emissions by two percent a year until 2020. This places 
the program “more in a tradition of governance and planning than in 
activism and voluntarism”, according to La Cour. The deals only concern 
the emission from the municipality’s own activities (that is, not the private 
sector within the municipality). The idea was to create vertical integration, 
by pledging the mayor and involving the local chapters of the 
organization. According to La Cour, the project was also aimed at creating 
horizontal integration, by encouraging the municipalities to include all 
parts of its activities in their climate strategy. The project has been a 
success, with 75 out of 98 municipalities pledging to cut emissions so far.  
However, the project has not been very successful in activating the 
member mass. Few of the local leader I talked to had taken an active part 
in the project beyond the initiating phase. This usually meant encouraging 
their local municipality to join. Five of the local leaders saw the project as 
the responsibility of the central level, and they had not taken an active part 
beyond encouraging their local municipality to join the campaign. Two of 
the chapters did not feel that they had adequate resources to follow it up, 
but wanted to participate more actively. Some, like Michael Løvendal 
Kruse, regional leader in Storstrøm, was unsure if it would yield big 
results. “I won’t comment on whether they do anything in between the 
nice ceremonies with our president and the mayor drinking wine (laughs)”.  
Jens La Cour admitted that the project was less successful in engaging 
local chapters and activists than in achieving policy goals. In his view, the 
local chapters played a relatively marginal role, even if the project could, 
in theory, make great use of the fact that all local municipalities has a 
chapter with activists from the organization. La Cour did not think that 
local activists have the expertise to follow up on the work, and see the 
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campaign as mainly a cooperation between the local government and the 
central level of the organization. Still, some effort was being made to 
gather information about successful communal efforts, which may be 
disseminated to other municipalities by the local activists, according to La 
Cour.  
4.3 Norway: The people’s action 
The People’s Action for an Oil Free Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja (the 
People’s Action from now on) is not purely a climate-related campaign, 
neither is it an internal campaign. However, it should be mentioned, as it is 
an important source of climate-related activism within NNV. As we have 
seen, the dominant oil industry is a focal point for the leadership of the 
Conservation Society. The oil industry has increased their activity, and the 
issue of oil drilling outside of Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja has been a 
divisive issue within the highest echelons of Norwegian politics. The 
current red-green coalition government is split on the issue.  The issue 
concerns both local wildlife, natural beauty, tourism and fish stocks, as 
well as climate change. The People’s Action is a central channel of 
mobilization and activism in the environmental movement.  
 As we have seen, “people’s actions” have played an important role in the 
Norwegian environmental movement. People’s actions are ad-hoc 
organizations, often designed to include as many organizations as possible 
in a broad coalition against singular issues. These actions sometimes with 
have their own members and democratic structure. NNV has traditionally 
maintained strong ties to these actions. Both the leader and the second in 
command in the Conservation Society have been central to the 
establishment of two of the most successful People’s movements on 
climate issues: The current president Lars Haltbrekken, then leader of the 
Conservation Society’s youth organization Nature and Youth, was the 
leader of the people’s movement against gas powered plants in the late 
90s. The current vice president Ingeborg Gjærum, then leader of Nature 
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and Youth, co-founded the current People’s action for an oil-free Lofoten, 
Vesterålen and Senja.  
According to Gjærum, the organization has also kept an active role in 
running the organization. The Conservation Society spend large resources 
on administrating the action’s member lists. However, organization is 
obscuring their own involvement in the people’s action, among other 
things out of fear that they may not engage enough people on their own. 
She argued that the case of Lofoten and Vesterålen was described as “a 
little bit extreme”, as far as people’s actions go, as the Conservation 
Society is especially closely involved in its operations.  
There were three important reasons for preferring this model. Former 
managing director Jan Thomas Odegard pointed to increased short-time 
mobilization potential, and the ability to cooperate with other 
organizations. In terms of efficiency, the protest form increased awareness 
of the issue, and made it stick out from the other issues of the organization.  
In terms of efficiency, all sources agreed that the battle for Lofoten and 
Vesterålen (which is still ongoing) would have failed already without the 
use of the “people’s action model.  
The actions lowered the barriers of entry for people who are not members 
of any established organizations, who wanted to get involved in the issue, 
especially in the local population. A perceived benefit was that the local 
population would not be deterred by other, more contentious stances, such 
as the Conservation Society’s defense for the local wolf population. As 
organizational Secretary Steinar Alsos argued:  
People can be prejudiced against organizations. They 
think we are only interested in wolves, and do not see us 
as a platform to work with oil-related issues. Supporting 
an organization requires more conviction than supporting 
one of our core issues. 
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The participation of other organizations also increased the scope of the 
protests, especially large, influential organizations such as the Church and 
the biggest labor union LO.  The other organizations were involved as 
equal partners. While the participating organizations were of unequal size, 
they saw it as important to “share” the issue equally among the 
participants, according to former managing director Jan Thomas Odegard.  
One of the first things I did in NNV was to enter the 
coalition of organizations which got behind the people’s 
action [against oil drilling in Lofoten and Vesterålen]. It 
was almost like a stand-off, where each organization 
promised not to “run away with the issue”  
 
The people’s actions are all-out efforts, and has often come at the expense 
of long-term mobilization; according to Jan Thomas Odegard. “The great 
dilemma is that the issue comes in the way of the organization”.   This 
pattern is visible in the organization’s history. After the ultimately 
unsuccessful Alta protests, the Conservation Society and the 
environmental movement in general saw a strong downturn in membership 
(Berntsen, 2011: pp. 249-255). According to the president Lars 
Haltbrekken, this form of work is still the most effective on singular 
issues, but may be part of the explanation for the low amount of members 
in the environmental movement in Norway compared to the rest of 
Scandinavia.   
The people’ actions do not engage many local activists within the 
organization. One might expect that the three regions in the north, where 
the larges battle against the oil industry had been fought, would see a rise 
in membership and activity, but this did not seem to be the case. 
Interviews with Gunnar Reinholtsen, Erling Solvang and Ragnhild Sandøy 
from the nearby regions of Finnmark, Nordland and Troms showed that 
the local participation was relatively low, even though many of the 
members were also members of the people’s action. According to Jan 
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Thomas Odegard, former general manager of NNV, it has been hard to 
establish local chapters based on the work against the oil industry.  
It might seem strange that such short-term mobilizations should harm the 
organizations that take part of it. The president Lars Haltbrekken 
explained this as a result of poor strategy.  
(…) what the environmental organizations have been poor 
at is to cooperate with them, and reap the rewards 
afterwards, through new members et cetera. 
 
This has led to some second thoughts about the strategy. The vice 
president, Ingeborg Gjærum, was one of the founders of the people’s 
action for an oil-free Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja. In her interview, she 
expressed frustration about how many environmentally conscious people 
did not see the Conservation Society as a natural channel of involvement, 
even though they were engaged in issues the Conservation Society works 
with. “I wish more people thought ‘I care about this issue, let’s join the 
Conservation Society”.  
Not only did the people’s actions not engage new members, it drained 
resources from the local chapters. Jan Thomas Odegard acknowledged that 
these temporary organizations were “draining a lot of local resources”.  
Erling Solvang, local leader in Nordland, the region of Lofoten and 
Vesterålen, confirmed this, noting that local members had become “worn 
out” by their involvement in people’s actions.   
These two programs are very different, but they share some important 
qualilties. Both forms of action involves a certain trade-off between 
organizational and political goals. So far, the trade-off seems to be 
politically effective. Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja is still not open to oil 
drilling, and the Climate Municipality project has been successful in 
getting over three quarters of Denmark’s municipalities to cut their 
emissions voluntarily. But they do little to strengthen mobilization and 
local activity.   In the Norwegian case, the People’s action has strained the 
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local level, and possibly weakened the organization’s ability to recruit and 
engage members through their established organizational structure. In 
Denmark, the local activists are largely superfluous in the process, beyond 
the initiating phase. As we will see in the next chapter, the local activists 
are struggling to engage climate issues.  
5.0 Local apprehension towards climate change  
The most important venue for local climate action is the established 
structure of local and regional chapters. These chapters have all been 
formed before the climate issue became important for the organizations. 
Their work with climate change is channeled through new forms of 
activity, or as a “reconceptualization” of existing issues. Here, I will 
provide a “snapshot” of current activity within the local and regional 
chapters, to see how much of the organizations’ increased focus on climate 
change has resonated in their local chapters. In Table 1 and 2, I have 
summarized the answers on four key question that I asked all the local 
leaders during my interviews with them, regarding their involvement in, 
and assessment of climate change, in Norway and Denmark respectively.  
 
5.1 Norwegian local chapters – autonomous and critical  
Table 1: Overview of climate work in local chapters, NNV.   
 
 
Does local 
chapters in 
your region 
work with 
issues 
related to 
climate 
change?  
Does climate 
change-related 
issues conflict 
with other issues 
you work with. 
How 
many 
activists 
in your 
region?  
Is climate 
change 
important 
for the 
organizati
on?   
Are chapters 
important in 
the work 
against 
climate 
change?  
Oslo og 
Akershus 
No.  Yes, strongly 
critical to 
central policy.  
260 Yes.  In principle, 
but we are 
critical.   
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Buskerud Yes, mainly 
local 
climate 
plans.  
No, but worried 
about future 
wind plans.  
20-30 yes Yes.  
Nord- 
Trøndelag 
Some, 
mainly 
letters to the 
editor.  
Not locally, but 
critical to 
central policy.  
30-40 yes Yes.  
Telemark Some, 
mainly 
transportati
on.  
No, but critical 
to central policy.  
>20 yes Yes  
Aust-
Agder 
No.  Yes, especially 
wind power.  
Low 
activity.  
yes Yes.  
Vest-
Agder 
Yes, 
through 
several 
projects. 
No, but some 
internal disputes 
over wind 
power.  
30-40  yes Yes, very.  
Rogaland Some, 
mainly 
transportati
on.  
Yes, especially 
wind power.  
40 yes No.  
Hordaland Yes, 
through 
several 
projects. 
No.  80 yes Yes, very.  
Sogn og 
Fjordane 
Some, 
mainly 
transportati
on.  
No, but some 
internal disputes 
over wind 
power.  
Two 
active 
chapters
. >10 
yes Yes.  
Hedmark Some, 
mainly 
communal 
climate 
Yes, esp. wind 
power and 
hydro plants.  
>10 yes Yes. 
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plans. 
Sør-
Trøndelag 
Yes, 
through 
several 
projects. 
Yes, especially 
on wind power.  
40-50 yes Yes., Very.  
Vestfold Yes, mainly 
local zoning 
policy.   
No.  >20 yes Yes, very.  
Nordland Some, 
mainly 
related to 
local 
industry.  
Yes, esp. wind 
and 
hydropower, 
and tree 
planting.  
>10 yes Needs more 
resources.  
Troms Some, 
mainly oil 
drilling.  
Yes, very 
critical to wind 
power and 
central policy.  
15-20 yes Needs more 
resources.  
Finnmark Some, 
mainly oil 
drilling.  
 
Yes, esp. wind 
power, power 
lines, and 
central policy.  
~5 yes Needs more 
resources.  
Oppland Some, 
mainly 
energy 
conservatio
n.  
No, but critical 
to energy 
development 
projects. 
20-40 yes Yes.  
Møre og 
Romsdal 
Yes, 
especially 
on energy 
conservatio
n and gas 
power 
plants. 
No, but slightly 
critical to some 
energy 
development 
projects  
~10 yes Yes, but 
varies over 
time.  
Østfold Yes, Yes, especially ~10 yes In principle, 
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especially 
on 
transportati
on. 
wind power.  but not so 
far.  
Total  7 yes, 9 
maybe, 2 
no.  
9 yes, 9 no 608-705 All yes   12 yes  5 
maybe 1 no   
As we can see, all local leaders saw climate change as important. A clear 
majority also see the local chapters as an important part of the climate 
struggle. Nine of the leader report that there is local conflict over climate 
change-related issues, and seven more reported climate-related 
disagreement or discontent.  
The main cause of conflict was local power development. In three cases, 
the discontent was tied to a general criticism of the central level’s policies. 
Seven local chapters reported that they were working actively with climate 
change, and nine more reported that they were doing some climate-related 
activism. This was often tied to existing issues where climate change was 
part of the argument, such as road development. These are interesting 
results: the local chapters are in favor of climate change activism in 
general, and see themselves as important parts of this effort, but are only 
to a limited degree working with climate change-related issues. In 
addition, there is much conflict and disagreement over climate change 
issues.  
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5.2 Danish local chapters – unsure about their own role  
Table 2: Overview of climate work in local chapters, DN.   
Denmark         
 Does local chapters in 
your region work 
with climate-related 
issues?  
6) Does 
climate change-
related issues 
conflict with other 
issues you work 
with. 
Is climate 
change 
important for 
the 
organization?  
Are local 
chapters 
important 
 In climate 
work?  
Vestjylland Yes, many projects, 
mainly 
“klimakommuner”  
Yes, mixed 
experiences with 
windmills.  
yes Yes.  
Fyn Some, mainly 
klimakommuner.  
No, but thinks 
nature conservation 
is more important.  
yes No, central 
level  
most 
important.  
Roskilde Yes, mainly 
transportation.  
Yes, mainly 
windmills.  
yes Yes. 
Nordjylland Yes, klimakommuner 
and adaptation, and 
against plans for 
fracking of gas.  
No.  yes Yes.  
Nordsjælland Some, mainly 
klimakommuner.  
Yes, especially 
windmills.  
yes Yes, but 
central level  
most 
important.  
Vestsjælland Some, mainly 
klimakommuner.  
No.  yes Not really,  
more of a 
“global” 
issue.  
Storstrøm Some, mainly 
klimakommuner.  
Yes, especially 
windmills.  
yes No, only if 
concrete 
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 issues 
appear   
locally.  
Østjylland Some, mainly 
klimakommuner, 
some on adaptation.  
No. Positive 
towards windmills.  
yes Yes.  
Storkøbenhavn No.  Yes, especially 
windmills.  
no Not really.  
Sydjylland   No.  Yes, especially 
windmills.  
Yes.  Yes.  
Total  3 yes, 5 some, 2 no. 6 yes, 4 no 9 yes 1 no 6 yes 4 no  
The responses from Denmark showed, at first glance, larger concerns for 
the climate. All but two respondents in Denmark reported working with 
climate change in some form or another. However, most of them referred 
to the “climate municipality” project. I differed the responses between 
those who were actively involved in this and other forms of local climate 
activity, and those who had only been involved in the project in the 
initiating phases, and did not actively follow it up or work with other 
climate-related issues (described as having done “some” activism). Only 
one local chapter did not see climate change as important for the 
organization, but four of the responders did not see local chapters as 
important in the organization’s climate change work. A larger portion of 
the responders than in Norway. Six of the responders reported that the 
climate issue caused conflict locally, and all of them reported windmill 
projects as the main cause. 
This overview gives us some insight into the current local work with - and 
assessment of - climate change. As we can see, a large portion of local 
leaders in both organizations are involved with climate change. The issue 
is contentious in both countries. In Denmark, a larger portion of the 
respondents argued that the issue was not “local”, but rather something the 
national level should engage in. On the whole, the local level seems more 
split and apprehensive of the climate issue than their leaders and the 
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professional secretariat at the central office, at least in Norway, where the 
central level spends a large part of the budget on climate change-related 
issues. But the overview does not give us a good approximation of how 
strongly held these opinions are, or what arguments they are based on. In 
the following chapters, I will go deeper into the answers. 
5.3 Horizontal cooperation on the local level 
The local chapters also coordinate their climate work through less 
hierarchical structures. I have chosen to look at two of the clearest 
examples of “horizontal cooperation”, which share several similarities.  
Both rely largely on a network structure, where information and ideas are 
shared between local issues. The first is the “climate network”, found in 
Denmark, the second is the “oil free”-campaign, found in Norway. The 
latter also share similarities with the “Climate Municipalities” program, as 
it is focused on a single, quantifiable goal. Here, I will present the two 
programs, and how they are currently functioning.  
Norway: Oil free    
“Oil Free” is a campaign aimed at companies and consumers. The 
campaign encourages people to install energy-conserving technologies in 
offices and homes to phase out polluting oil-powered central heating 
ovens, and offers help in connecting customers to reliable vendors. The 
initiative was taken on the local level, by the regional leader Nils Tore 
Skogland in Hordaland in 2006. Skogland saw that there were many good 
solutions to reduce energy consumptions, but few were systematically 
employed. One problem was that the market was not adapted to the home 
market. The market was, in Skoglands eyes, hard to understand for 
individual consumers. His idea was to create a common effort between the 
business, the organization and the citizens, to fill the gap between national 
goals and local efforts on energy preservation. In Skoglands view, this was 
also a good form of local activism for the organization.  
The Conservation Society had an especially interesting 
role because we both talked to politicians, had the 
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scientific insight and also knew about the practical aspects 
– some of our members worked with small things, with 
little political effect, and many worked with large issues 
without grounding in society. We wanted to combine 
these things, in such a way that we both helped those who 
needed a practical solution, and took the lead in those 
areas where the barriers and solutions for change are  
 
The project has been developed together with municipal  government and 
the private sector. Skogland contacted the business council, the city 
council in Bergen and private businesses. With project funding from the 
municipality, the campaign was launched in 2007, with one paid project 
coordinator. The municipality participated in the campaign directly by 
mailing all 9000 registered owners of oil heaters in the city, 
recommending them to change to more environmentally friendly 
alternatives. Since then, the share of emissions of CO2 in Bergen due to oil 
heaters has been reduced from 13 percent to 9 percent. The project has 
received support from the central level of the organization, which has 
hired a central coordinator to help spread the campaign.  
Oil Free offers a new venue of local activism, but requires a large amount 
of expertise. According to Skogland, the members running the campaign 
in Bergen are highly educated, including an economist, and an engineer. 
They operate as a form of consultants, trying to connect businesses with 
customers. As such, the program has a relatively high barrier of entry for 
local volunteers who want to participate in climate-related work. 
Main benefits of the projects according to local leaders that have adopted 
it, is that it is practical and to the direct benefit of the local population. 
After the first stage in Bergen, the project has also been launched in two 
other major cities, Trondheim, and Kristiansand. The project has been 
offered, but not taken up, in several regions, mainly because of lack of 
resources. In Vestfold, the leader Øyvind Johnsen pointed to limited 
resources and a lack of support from the secretariat.  Møre og Romsdal, 
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the leader Øystein Folden also pointed to the secretariat, saying that they 
had simply not received any offer or proposal to join the campaign yet.  In 
Rogaland, the program was seen as hard to implement for political 
reasons. According to local leader Erik Thoring, the reason the strong 
dominance of the oil sector in the region was to blame:    
We have worked a little bit regionally to establish 
oljefri.no, but it has shown itself to be slow and difficult 
work (…) Perhaps not too hard to understand, when we 
have both legs planted in the oil barrel, Rogaland is an 
exception in that respect.   
 
Denmark: The climate Network  
In Denmark, a “Climate Network” was established in 2007, on the 
initiative of local activists. The network was initiated as part of the effort 
to mobilize people in connection to the COP15 summit I 2009, and has 
since prevailed. As participation is voluntary, and mainly consists of 
meetings, the number of members is hard to calculate. At the meeting I 
attended, around 15 people were present. The leader is the veteran 
environmentalist Christian Bundgaard,  who have previously written 
popular books on ecology and politics in Denmark, and taken part in the 
development of the environmental policy of the Socialist people’s party.  
According to organizational secretary Nick Leyssac, the network structure 
is an established way for local activists to connect with activists in other 
parts of the country. The networks typically has regular mail contact, and 
arrange seminars. Networks work with issues such as farming, Agenda 21, 
sound and light pollution, hunting and urban ecology. Each network has a 
contact person within the secretariat, which, among other things, attend 
meetings and relays their ideas to the secretariat. In the view of the 
secretariat, the networks’ main purpose is information sharing and 
networking, getting to know other individuals in the organization with a 
special interest in chosen topics.  
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The self-image of the Network’s participants was slightly different. During 
a discussion among the members of the climate network22, Palle Marcher 
argued that the Climate Network should be counted a “political network”, 
along with Agenda 21 and the farming network. This distinction indicate a 
stronger, more important role than simple information sharing. The leader 
Christian Bundgaard agreed. In other terms, it wanted to be more of a 
“bottom-up” channel of influence on the organization’s climate policy 
than simply a horizontal platform for the interchange of ideas.  
According to Nick Leyssac, The Networks have been given more power 
the past five years. The goals were to increase knowledge sharing and, 
importantly, provide new venues for activism within the organization. In 
an effort to give the networks a clearer status in the organization, the 
networks morphed into more coherent bodies, with leadership. This has in 
turn caused a conflict between some of the networks and the central level. 
In a preliminary paper prepared for the upcoming reform of the 
organization’s democratic structure, this new form of network structure is 
described as a failure. 
The experience after five years of formalized networks 
are predominantly negative. (…) It has not led to 
increased sharing of knowledge or attracted new activists 
to a significant degree. On the contrary, it has led to 
destructive debates and unfruitful struggles for power – 
this is partly because the networks have been more 
concerned with changing our policies than inspiring our 
local activists. Two of the networks also have serious 
problems with accepting that they cannot lobby external 
parties autonomously.23 
 
According to the president Ella Maria Bisschop-Larsen, the Climate 
Network was “difficult”. One reason for the conflict was that their leader, 
Christian Bundgaard, had contacted officials (such as the Minister of 
                                              
22 This quote is based on my recording of the Network’s meeting  
23 Peter Mellergaard, Demokrati - Organisationsudvalgets udredning af foreningsdemokratiet i 
DN – et debatoplæg, 2012 
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Climate and Energy) or made statements on behalf of the network. 
Bisschop-Larsen drew parallels to how a political party operates, and 
described the network as “not fully governable”. One concern was that 
they would support projects that the organization had protested, especially 
in the case of wind power projects, which the network has been more 
positive towards than the mother organization. She argued that the central 
level is open to disagreements, but demands respect for the organization’s 
policies. The network has been in conflict with the national board as well 
as the secretariat. Organizational secretary Nick Leyssac argued that: 
“They are not autonomous, but they are acting autonomously”  
The conflict has two important dimensions: the political, and the 
organizational. Firstly, the networks holds a more pro-environmental 
stance, in the balance between for instance landscape preservation and 
CO2 reductions. To square differences between these issues, the central 
level see it as important to counterweigh the network’s stances with other 
arguments within the organizations. Following from this, a central 
complaint about the network was that they performed activism outside of 
the democratic channels. These two are strongly connected. Because of the 
need to find difficult compromises between different views among the 
organization’s members, there is little acceptance for those who may rock 
the boat. As climate advisor Jens La Cour argued:  
[The network] can have what opinions they would like, 
but the organization has an adopted policy. Our policies 
have been developed over a long time, in dialogue with 
our national politicians and with a consultation among our 
local committees (…). Our local chapters are following 
these policies and we cannot reverse them just, because 
twelve people are making a fuss.  
 
The organizational conflict also stems from a certain degree of power 
struggle within the organizations. In the view of Jens La Cour, the reason 
for the conflict was that large organizations such as DN would always 
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attract some very engaged and focused individuals, with their own agenda, 
who might want to use the organization as a power base. “They can 
influence others, and then get elected as a local leader or to the national 
leadership, but these people don’t do that, and then they think they can 
lead from below, and you can’t.” Christian Bundgaard, the leader of the 
network conceded that he had joined the network to gain a platform for 
activism. The Network members argues that they should be given more 
power. They are especially critical to not being involved in the 
organization’s scientific committees. The secretariat was critical to the 
idea of including the networks in this process, arguing that this was the 
task of the National Board.  
During my visit to a meeting in the Climate Network, I was able to hear 
their side of this conflict, as it was discussed internally. The members 
spent much of their time discussing the upcoming curbing of their power. 
This may not be surprising, at the discussion about their autonomy was 
and is ongoing, until the fall of 2013. A central concern was that the 
networks would become little more than a mouthpiece for the central level. 
In the eyes of Thorben Thorsen, of the Climate Network leadership, the 
secretariat had started to act more as a political actor than an 
administrative level.  “It’s the same organizational structure you’ve found 
in the political parties, that, that things are streamlined, you know (…) A 
different culture has appeared.”  
The current conflict is to be resolved in the fall of 2013. This new venue of 
membership involvement has created conflict, and may be restructured to 
give the central level more control, making the role of the members less 
important. If the network’s activists are able to impact this process, they 
may become more integrated in the climate work, increasing member 
participation in the organization’s climate policy formulation.  Currently, 
the network has positioned themselves as a venue for national climate 
action for members.   
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There are similarities between the oil free campaign and the Climate 
Network. Both increases communication and lets local leaders share their 
experiences. The regions where local activists had implemented the Oil 
Free campaign were generally more involved with climate change than 
those who had not.  At the same time, the Oil Free campaign is more 
focused on concrete action. While the Climate Network has become a 
contentious entity, the Oil Free campaign has been encouraged by the 
central level, which now devote resources to supporting the project. One 
reason might be that the Oil Free campaign has a clear, local goal that 
would be harder to attain by central actors. The local activists can visit 
people, arrange shows and demonstrations of the technology, and maintain 
close contact with local politicians and businesses. Meanwhile, the 
Climate Network does not have a concrete goal, and have on at least one 
occasion acted as a “competitor” to the central level, contacting national 
politicians. In this perspective, the “Oil Free” projects can be seen as a less 
ambitious version of the “Climate Municipality” project, which fosters 
more activism, and gives the local leaders more autonomy.  It is worth 
noting that Norway also has a climate network, but according to climate 
advisor  Holger Schaupitz, it has largely been dormant since its conception 
in 2008.  
Climate change – a top-down issue?   
How can we sort these different venues of activism? Mainstream 
environmentalist organizations must strike a balance between internal 
autonomy and cohesion. While the organizations resent attempts to 
“govern from below”, local activists are volunteers, and cannot be 
dictated. This sentiment was especially strong in Norway, where 
organizational secretary Steinar Alsos saw it as hard to facilitate activism 
from “above”. “That’s how it has to be: The local chapters are 
autonomous, and you [the local activists] have to work with what engages 
you”. The organizations may of course expel chapters or activists that do 
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not follow the democratically agreed-upon policies, but the local work 
cannot be dictated.   
The volunteer efforts are of course also a great strength.  Forms of action 
that increase individual choices and involve them in decisions have been 
shown to increase people’s motivation to engage in an issue. Such 
motivation, in turn, strengthens all other forms of environmental action 
(Guin et al, 1998: 647). Within the field of psychology, self-determination 
theorists such as Deci and Ryan (1987) have argued that events and 
contexts that support autonomy facilitate activity that is more flexible, 
entail less tension and creates more positive emotions. These in turn 
engender a greater level of creativity and conceptual understanding (Deci 
& Ryan 1987: 1033). This makes it relevant to consider how much 
autonomy is granted through the different venues of climate activism. 
Below, I have roughly mapped out the different forms of climate work 
discussed above. My main indicators are how many of the organization’ 
activists they engage (in other words- not counting passive members), and 
how much autonomy the activists have in the process.   
 
Figure 2: Venues of climate action in NNV (Norway)  
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Figure 3: Venues of climate action in DN (Denmark)  
 
As described above, the local chapters generally have less autonomy in 
Denmark. In both organizations, the other venues of climate action are 
generally given little autonomy. Only the local chapters remain 
autonomous, but less so in Denmark than in Norway, as the Danish 
chapters have to seek funding from the central level for their local 
activities. Note that I have placed the different venues of activism relative 
to each other. Even though I have placed “work through local chapters 
closer to a “high” level of climate activism. This indicates the relative 
number of activists compared to the other venues, but does not mean that 
all local chapters are involved in this kind of work.  
The two “climate products” available for the activists - the Climate 
Municipalities project and the People’s Actions - share several qualities. 
Both the Climate Municipalities project and the People’s Actions mainly 
offer activities focused on singular decisions – pledging to cut emissions, 
and opening or not opening new areas for oil exploration. The top-down 
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approaches are different in scope and form, but in both organizations, they 
have had little effect in mobilizing local members. This harmonized with 
previous research in environmental sociology, which has described top-
down approaches to involvement of lay people as largely ineffective. As 
Læssøe (2008) argues, top-down approaches “do not only ignore the 
uncertainties of scientific knowledge, they marginalize the experience-
based local knowledge of citizens as well” (Læssøe 2008:146).  
While the Norwegian People’s movement is not truly an internal program, 
efforts have been made to include local members in the external 
organization’s work, and the organization has been heavily supported by 
the Conservation Society. The local chapters are not heavily involved, and 
that the program has at times weakened the local level both by hogging 
resources and, in some instances, by wearing out members. In Denmark, 
the Climate Municipality project has also seen meager results in terms of 
including members. In practice, the program makes the central level of the 
organization the main actor in the negotiations with local municipalities, 
and the general public.  
The two “horizontal” approaches shows two diverging strategies for 
including members in climate change work. The Norwegian Oil Free 
campaign offers a narrow field of action on a concrete issue which 
increases local involvement in climate change. The program resembles 
Jamison and Eyerman’s (1991) description of a “cognitive praxis”, 
involving members in social action which makes the local 
environmentalists central actors in combining cosmological and 
technological knowledge. As the initiator of the project Nils Tore 
Skogland argued: “We play an important role as an environmental 
organization, not consultants, not lobbyists. We are the independent source 
of expertise people need.” The leadership of the Danish Climate Network 
have cast themselves in roles more similar to the central level, and offers 
few concrete venues of climate action in local chapters. Instead, they try to 
frame their activities as a bottom-up channel of influence on national 
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politics. This has created a power struggle between the local activists in 
the network and the central level, and a wedge between some of the 
organization’s most climate-concerned members and their national 
leadership.  
5.4 Chapter summary  
As we have seen, climate change is at the top of the agenda of the central 
level of the two organizations, but not fully integrated in the organization’s 
local work. New forms of climate work inspires little activism, and take 
the form of more professionalized advocacy, with the exception of the Oil 
free-campaign. While there is local activity on the climate issue, may of 
the activists feel conflicted about climate change, especially when 
renewable energy production destroys local nature. An early conclusion 
might be that the organizational secretary of DN is right: the climate issue 
does not lend itself to local work, and activists should stick to issues that 
are “local”. But this conclusion would be premature. After all, the climate 
issue is not approached in a vacuum, but disseminated in a structure with 
existing cracks and fault lines, among activists with established 
preferences and capacities, and within local contexts. In the following 
three chapters, I will go deeper into the answers from the local activists, 
and outline three perspectives that may deepen our understanding of how, 
and under what circumstances the climate issue can be “made local”.  
6.0 A turn away from local activism?   
All the Norwegian activists argued that it was important for the 
organization to work with climate change, and all but one thought the local 
chapter was (12) or could be (5) important in the organization’s climate 
work. In Denmark, nine out of the ten responders thought climate change 
was important to work for the organization, and six of them saw the local 
chapters as important. This indicates that a large portion of the members 
want to work with climate change, and think that this could be done at the 
local level. However, several factors make climate change activism in the 
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local chapters difficult. In this, and the following chapters, I will look at 
three important aspects of this problem: the general development of the 
organizations away from local activism, the professionalization of the 
organization at both the local and central level, the contexts in which 
activists approach the climate issue locally, and the way the organizations’ 
climate policy utilize local expertise, and harmonize climate knowledge 
with local experiences. 
6.1 Professionalization and centralization  
Climate change has been approached in a period marked by 
professionalization and centralization of the environmental movement, 
which has also been charted in Norway and Denmark.  The changing 
strategies of the environmental movement has transformed the role of 
members. In studies of both the Danish and Norwegian environmental 
movement, scholars point to a general trend of centralization and 
professionalization of the movement, where members become less 
important (Bortne et al 2002:18). In most fields of political organization in 
Scandinavia, the organizations started out as member-based, with local 
chapters. In the environmental field, the development of a strong local 
presence came much later, in the 60s and 70s (Bortne et al 2002:15). This 
development is largely seen as a “break” from the populist tradition of the 
second wave.  
Bortne et al. (2002) point to three indicators of this development in the 
Norwegian context: Environmental organizations have become more 
hierarchical, the central level of the organizations participate in coalitions 
with other organizations through “umbrella organizations” and campaigns, 
and more people have mobilized locally on specific issues without joining 
national organizations (Bortne et al 2002: pp 130-131). Danish civil 
society has been described as increasingly individualized. “The social 
movements that flourished in the 70s and 80s have been weakened, and 
replaced by less ambitious single-issue organizations” (Togeby 2003:17).  
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This has been accompanied by an increasingly institutionalized access to 
decision-making, which is especially prevalent in the Nordic countries 
(Rootes 1999:155). The same trend has been noted among environmental 
movement organizations across Europe, especially in the most established 
organizations. Rootes (1999) notes that “As constructive contacts have 
developed with more powerful actors, official and corporate, so relations 
between [environmental movement organizations] and activists have 
become increasingly problematic” (Rootes 1999:154). The same pattern 
have been found in similar organizations in both the UK and the US 
(Dowie 1996) (Dryzek et al 2003). However, the Scandinavian 
environmental movements are seen as especially marked by this trend, as 
they have developed strong ties to their governments.  
Organizations neglect their membership, even as a mere 
source of income (…) and the size of that membership 
declines. The Nature Conservation Society in particular 
has become heavily and increasingly dependent on state 
funding with time. (…) government financial support to 
environmental organizations has served to 'gradually 
debilitate the genuinely voluntary' (Dryzek et al. 2003: 
pos 1419-1420). 
The strategy is largely a trade-off between grassroots activity and central 
efforts through legislation, litigation and lobbyism, as well as media work. 
The pattern has been found in similar first-wave organizations, such as the 
Sierra Club in the United States. In his book “Losing Ground”, Mark 
Dowie derided the leadership of the mainstream organization for having, 
(…) developed a self-confident conviction that their 
strategy – a legislative/litigative initiative focused largely 
on the federal government – is central to the 
environmental effort. They see regional grassroots activity 
(…) as at best helpful, at worst an embarrassing sideshow 
(…) (Dowie 1996:5) 
In European green parties, as in many political organizations, there has 
been internal conflict between green fundamentalists and more pragmatic 
“realists” (O'Neill M.  2012: pp. 4169-4171). While the environmental 
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organizations in Norway and Denmark has not formed themselves into a 
political party, the dilemma is clear in their choice of strategy. A strong 
focus on lobbyism implies a pragmatic outlook. This development can be 
seen in light of the classical theory of the “iron law of oligarchies”, 
described at an early point by Robert Michels in his 1914 study of 
European socialist parties (Michels 2001). 
There are several indicators of this; one is simply the membership 
numbers. In both Denmark and Norway, the Conservation Societies have 
seen their membership numbers halve from the early 1990s. In Norway, 
from 40 000 to a little over 20 000, in Denmark from around 260 000 to 
around 135 000. Meanwhile, the central level has been stable, and 
increased in size and importance in both NNV and DN. The issue of 
climate change in particular has been addressed mainly on the central 
level, and by non-member based “here and now”-organizations without 
ordinary members, such as Bellona (1986) and Zero (2002). This is partly 
because the relationship between organizational strength and political 
influence has been weakened during the past decades. Smaller 
organizations gained disproportional levels of political influence. This 
weakened then emphasis on membership recruitment and socializing (or 
forming of organizational cohesion).  According to Bortne et al. (2002),  
“The whole role of members are changing” in the environmental field, 
with the advent of more specialized non-member based organizations, and 
more cooperation on the central level instead of mobilization and 
activation of the member base (Bortne et al 2002:130). 
While DN does not receive a large part of their funding from the 
government, similar trends have been noted in the Danish Environmental 
movement. Læssøe (2007) argues that the professionalization of the 
Danish environmental NGOs has debilitated the role of local activists. 
Describing, among others, DN, he argues that: 
This professional turn had serious consequences for the 
direct Involvement of citizens. Rather than trying to 
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empower ordinary citizens to participate, the professional 
environmental NGOs [have] adopted the role of 
representative actors on behalf of the people and the 
environment. (Læssøe 2007:237) 
As a result, the mainstream organizations risk undermining their popular 
base, an important source of legitimacy of the entire movement.  
Many environmental organizations have lost their unique 
movement character and therefore an important part of 
their strength. It is doubtful whether their stronger 
position at some negotiating tables will compensate for 
this. (Heijden 1997:44) 
This is reflected in a large membership with relatively low level of 
activity. Ghoul Andersen (2004) points out that while an impressive 14 
percent of the population in Denmark is part of an environmental 
organization, only a sixth of these members are active, and even less do 
volunteer work. In political parties, the level of activity is twice as high 
(Andersen 2004: 106). 
This trend may be stronger in Denmark, as the Danish environmental 
movement has had stronger ties to Brussels through the Danish 
membership in the EU. This new arena of political activity has mainly 
been approached through the established channels of corporatist 
involvement, and one effect has been that the organizations have 
strengthened their ties “upwards”, to both national and European 
government (Christiansen & Nørregaard 2003:134). 
As we have seen, DN spends as much money on climate lobbyism as they 
do on the Climate Municipality program. Even more striking is NNV, 
which spend a quarter of their budget on climate work at the central level. 
The main benefit of the trade-off between grassroots activism and 
professional central work is efficiency, but the strategy may also lead to 
weakened legitimacy.  The vice president of NNV, Ingeborg Gjærum was 
aware of this danger.   
The entire Norwegian environmental movement is 
roaming the halls of the [parliament], thinking that that 
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will give them influence, but we know that the 
Government, especially the Labor Party, only cares about 
one thing: what do the people think? We can attend as 
many meeting as we want to, and get a lot of press as well 
(...) as long as they don’t lose a goddamn vote on the 
environmental issues, why would they care?   
These trends constitute an important context to how the climate issue has 
been approached. While the current scientific conceptualization of climate 
change lends itself to a “top-down” approach, the organizations 
themselves have developed towards being more top-heavy the past 
decades, due to processes that are not only tied to the issues.   
6.2 Internal division   
This development can also lead to a division between the local and central 
level. Bortne et al. notes that such a development would mean an 
“anglification” of the Scandinavian organizational sector. They define this 
as a situation where “there is one set of organizations at the local level, 
and another at the central level. The organizations at the local and the 
central level will no longer be connected hierarchically” (Bortne et al 
2002:131). 
Within the organizations I have studied, this pattern is most visible in the 
case of NNV. According to former organizational secretary Jan Thomas 
Odegard, the local chapters are almost “allergic” to the ideas from the 
central level.  As we have seen, NNV especially spends a large majority of 
its climate funds on activities at the central level. Activity on the 
contentious issue of oil drilling in Lofoten and Vesterålen has been 
channeled through a “People’s Movement” which is both a single-issue 
organization and a form of umbrella organization, where the central level 
cooperate with the central level of other organizations. This “umbrella” 
structure is to a certain degree mirrored at the local level. Leaders in some 
of the regional chapters in Norway such as Erik Thoring in Rogaland and 
Bjørn Frøsaker in Oppland pointed out that they work closer with other 
nature-oriented organizations on the local level, than they do with the 
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central level or other environmental organizations. Typical partners were 
the Norwegian Trekking Organization, and the Hunters and Fisher’s 
Organization. Here, the climate issue may also be a driver of this 
development. In both cases, the cooperation was focused on local 
opposition to windmill development.  
DN has also seen local opposition to windmills. According to climate 
advisor Jens La Cour, this has made it hard for some of the activists to 
accept the new climate issue. “For many of our activists, it’s almost been 
like we shouldn’t touch [climate change] because (…) if we are for this, 
we can’t be against [the windmills]. However, DNs stronger hierarchical 
structure seems to have been important in reducing internal disagreement. 
As climate advisor Jens La Cour argued, local chapters were expected to 
follow democratically agreed-upon policy, even when the results led to 
strong protests at the local level.  
We sometimes have to tell our local chapters, ‘that 
resistance, that kneejerk resistance to windmills…’ 
it…they shouldn’t protest. Because , I mean, one: they 
will lose the case, and two: it will make them unpopular 
and so on. 
    
And do they accept that?   
   
Yes, they do. They have to (…) They are to follow the 
policies we have agreed on in a organizational democratic 
process. This is no private sect, they are championing the 
cause of the organization. 
 
In Vestsjælland, the local leader Arne Hastrup argued that local concerns 
would have to give way to the organization’s national policy. “When there 
is a strategy at the central level, we follow it, we don’t argue”. Bjørn 
Petersen in Roskilde pointed out that they would contact the local leaders 
to ensure that their local work was in line with the organization’s policies. 
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This hierarchical quality affects the way the central level approach local 
activism, and the freedom the local chapters have to set their own issues 
on the agenda, but it also reduces the impact of internal struggles. The 
conflict surrounding the Climate Network stems from their disregard of 
the organization’s democratic, but relatively strong hierarchical structure. 
Another indication of this development is the increasing age gap within 
the organizations, mainly aligned along the central/local axis. As the 
organization’s membership has been halved in the past decades, the core 
of local activists has remained. Several of the activists I spoke to, such as 
Gjermund Andersen and Erik Thoring in NNV and Palle Marcher in DN, 
had been active for decades, and based their involvement in the movement 
on “older” issues. In Norway, organizational secretary Steinar Alsos 
pointed to generational differences as an underlying reason for internal 
differences, especially between the central and the local level.  
There are two very distinct schools in NNV, one is 
classical nature preservation, which was our starting 
point. Conserving biodiversity and conserving areas. It’s 
really quite conservative (…). The second school is more 
radical and has a political involvement which is just as 
much about justice, and a more global engagement. I 
belong to that school. (…) That stream is much more 
radical, and wants to change the societal structure to a 
larger degree. Sometimes these schools clash when we 
make policy, and I think the first school is stronger at the 
local level. Not that there’s anything wrong with that, of 
course.  
According to vice president Ingeborg Gjærum, the ideological differences 
were tied to the organization’s history of protesting renewable energy 
production. “Obviously, if you spent years of your life protesting the Alta 
[hydro] plant (…) you’ll have a problem with cheering on a lot of 
windmills.” However, the leader Lars Haltbrekken did not see generational 
differences as a clear pattern. “You’d think that the elderly are more 
critical to windmills, but they aren’t. There are also much younger people 
that are involved”.  
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 In Denmark, the central secretariat was worried about the general aging of 
their local activists. A previous measurement showed that the median age 
of activists had increased by nine years over a ten-year period, indicating 
that there was very poor recruitment of younger people. This was 
especially worrisome because, as organizational secretary Nick Leyssac 
bluntly put it: “in ten years many of them will be dead”.  His colleague 
Jens La Cour blamed this on a weakened interest in organizational work 
among younger people.  
The local activists also saw this as a sign that the organization did not have 
enough to offer new talent. Kurt Due Johansen, local leader in Fyn, had a 
recent example. 
 We had a young student at our last meeting who wanted 
to work with climate issues. She was a bit scared off by 
all the other work we were doing. It’s irritating, really. 
We’d love to work with this, but it’s a question of 
priorities. Wild nature comes first. 
Johansen’s comment touches upon the challenge of using work forms that 
may seem outdated, meaningless or boring to younger people.  
The prevalent notion in DN - that that this is simply due to a reduced 
interest in organizational work – was challenged when Danish 
environmentalists looked to Norway’s strong youth movement. Jens La 
Cour lamented the national differences: 
It’s remarkable that you can have an organization in 
Norway like Nature and Youth which is a popular 
organization. It is…it is cool to be a member of Nature 
and Youth. And it’s a bit…ah, nature is a bit nerdy in 
Denmark. 
DNs youth organization of the same name is quite small, counting below a 
thousand members. La Cour envied the Norwegian organization for having 
such a bountiful base for recruitment of new talents to the secretariat and 
the central leadership. But it is not just the youth that is eluding the grasp 
of the organization. According to La Cour, the brunt of the “workforce” 
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consists of retirees. “We see it [people volunteering] almost not until the 
children have moved out, or when people have retired.”  
However, there were deviances from this pattern. In Fyn, the local leader 
Kurt Due Johansen also saw an influx of students in the organization from 
the local university. The students did not seem to reflect generational 
differences in their view of nature and the environment, but were 
“interested in different things, some of them care about flowers, some 
about nature, some about the climate network”. But as in Norway, the 
students were hard to engage in the organization’s long term work, 
according to Johansen: “The problem with young people is that they are a 
bit ‘unfaithful’. They quickly lose interest. When they are done with their 
studies, they move. As an older man, you’ve got more time, and is more 
dependable”.  
Even though NNV’s strong youth organization was a source of envy in the 
Danish counterpart, few of the Norwegian local leaders reported any large 
influx of members from the youth organization. At the central level, 
however, several of the key members of the secretariat, are recruited from 
the youth organizations.  Both the president and vice president are 
previous leaders of Nature and Youth. Nature and Youth has traditionally 
had a more radical stance than the mother organization, and the uneven 
recruitment of “old” youth members may explain the ideological divide 
between the central and local level.  
6.3 Lack of resources at the local level  
We might expect that centralization has affected the local chapter’s 
capacity to work with issues. The organizations devote more resources to 
the central level than the local level.  However, only a few of the local 
leaders argued that lack of resources was an important reason for not being 
able to tackle climate change-related issues. Both were in NNV. In 
Nordland and Troms, the local leaders Erling Solvang and Ragnhild 
Sandøy argued that they did not have enough resources to tackle the issue, 
and that these had not been provided from the central level. Speaking 
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about the local work in general, Sandøy noted that the central level did not 
seem to prioritize their work “If we want to achieve anything and fight the 
regional government on equal terms, we’ll need more resources on the 
regional level (…)”.   
Several of the local chapters based a large part of their work on funds 
supplied by regional governmentally funded cooperation councils, 
especially the “Forum for Outdoors Activities and the Environment” or 
local government, and this impacted the choice of topics. In Buskerud, a 
large portion of the funds for the local secretary Per Klunderud’s work was 
provided by working on a project for the regional government.  
It’s almost a kind of ‘work’ that we do for the regional 
governor on cultural landscape preservation. We’ve been 
something akin to an arm of the local government, on 
issues that they haven’t been able to do by themselves.  
 
It is worth noting that the Norwegian local chapters receives a set sum of 
money over the organization’s budget, while the Danish local chapters 
may apply for funding for projects. In addition, DN sets aside more money 
per activist than the Norwegian counterpart does. This may explain why 
none of the Danish local leaders mentioned this as a problem.  
6.4 Passive activism  
The governmental inclusion and professionalization of the organizations 
have not only manifested itself at the central level. Several of the local 
leaders pointed out that professionalized forms of local work made it hard 
to pick up new issues. This mainly concerns the role as local hearing 
partner. Both in Denmark and Norway, hearings have a long tradition as a 
political instrument for the inclusion of “affected parties”. In Norway, it 
was introduced in the “neighbor law” as early as 1887, and has later 
become more widely used. (Asdal 2011:108) Environmental organizations 
have often taken the role as nature’s voice in these hearings (one of the 
slogans on the wall of DN was “We shall speak for the Hazel mouse”). 
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The formalized channels of are important sources of stability in the 
organizations’ local work. As Jamison (2001) points out, community-
based activism and grassroots activity is hard to sustain. Concerned 
citizens may unite against a particular issue, and then disperse once the 
issue is settled. (Jamison 2001:157) By organizing the work through local 
hearings, the local chapters can constitute a stable oppositional sphere, 
weighing in on any new encroachment on nature that may appear.  
This stability has a price. Writing responses to hearings is tedious, and not 
inviting to new recruits who might want to contribute. In addition, it casts 
the local activists in the relatively passive role of a cog in a bureaucratic 
machinery. Former managing director in NNV, Jan Thomas Odegard saw 
this as one reason why the local chapters had a hard time engaging new 
recruits.  
People are asked to write responses to hearings. The 
hearings used to be highly regarded in the inner core of 
the organization, and it is a very important democratic 
arena, but I think a lot of people feel like environmental 
‘spice’ in a process that is already decided.   
 
Another detrimental effect was that the volume of hearings crowded out 
other, more proactive forms of work. Almost all regional leaders in both 
countries complained about having too little time and resource to tackle 
the “workload” handed down from local and national governmental 
agencies. Annette Ugleberg in Sydjylland  argued that the local chapters 
were flooded by issues. “All the issues come in a small stream from the 
municipality and the central leadership. They are all sent to us, and not 
sorted before they are sent. There’s so much to read.”   
According to several of my sources, the reliance on these processes was an 
important reason for not engaging in climate change. The climate became 
a secondary issue when local activists felt overwhelmed by hearings on 
projects which put pressure on their local nature, a situation which 
frustrated some local leaders. As Kurt Due Johansen in Fyn argued: 
   
85 
 
 Generally speaking, we feel guilty about the climate 
issue. We are struggling to keep the ‘dirt from the 
doorstep’, there are so many issues being delivered to us 
from the government. Zoning, building permits and so on 
(…). There is so much to do, even if Odense is not a rural 
area, there is constant pressure on the natural resources. 
We have a lot to deal with.  
 
A large number of local leaders in Denmark noted that they were on the 
defensive. Arne Hastrup in Vestsjælland pointed out that they were more 
reactive than proactive. The local government was seen as the most 
important agenda-setter.  Several of the Norwegian local leaders reported a 
similar pattern. Torgeir Havik in Nord-Trøndelag felt that this made it hard 
to decide upon new issues to work with: “Our activity is often ruled by 
what kinds of issues crop up, and that not anything we or the central level 
can control. We get sent these issues as a hearing partner.”  
When a majority of the local activity comes from these channels, it is up to 
the local or national government whether the local environmentalists 
address climate change. If climate change-related decisions are taken on a 
level or through channels that are unavailable for local environmentalists, 
they are not well-equipped to protest. Several of the activists had been 
involved in climate-related activities by the local government, but this was 
more common in Denmark, where the local leaders in Sydjylland, 
Storstrøm, Roskilde and Nordjylland reported that they were included 
through “green councils”. These councils hold several meetings a year 
where local NGOs are invited to discuss the climate among other issues, or 
that they participated in hearings on municipal climate plans mandated 
from the National government.  In Norway, several of the local chapters 
had played a part in the hearing process leading up to the Municipal 
climate plans which were mandated by the national government in 2010, 
but only one respondent, Per Klunderud in Buskerud, reported to still be 
involved with these plans, by performing a third-party “audit” of their 
implementation.  
   
86 
 
The Danish local leaders are more closely tied to government than those in 
NNV. Since 1937, the main work method has been to raise local 
preservation cases through litigation. As the president argued: “It makes us 
a pseudo-governmental agency, not just a grassroots organization. We 
have a governmental mandate, we have been given responsibility.”  This 
special power is not connected to climate emissions, and is not currently 
being used in the organization’s climate work, according to the 
organization’s president Ella Maria Bisschop-Larsen.  
This tool is especially “binding” on the Danish local groups’ activities 
because the organizations does not trust the government to follow 
established law without their oversight. The president Ella Maria 
Bisschop-Larsen saw it as a significant problem that the government 
abused this special relationship. 
We always underline that our work is a supplement to the 
government. (…) We can raise official complaints, and all 
that, it means that some municipalities say that ‘it’s so 
uncomfortable for us to say no to something the people 
wants, so we leave that to the NGOs, you know. We do 
not accept that. I tell them every time: you must take the 
responsibility for keeping the letter of the law. It’s not the 
responsibility of local volunteers.   
 
The local activists in both organizations have been given a prominent role 
as hearing partners in municipal and governmental planning through 
hearings. However, this inclusion also binds several of the organizations to 
certain issues, and cast them in roles of local bureaucrats, writing reports 
as part of larger bureaucratic processes. As climate policy is not (yet) as 
inclusive as other forms of environmental policy, the inclusion can weaken 
the local chapter’s willingness and/or ability to approach new issues, 
where they do not have the same channels of influence as in nature 
preservation. According to former managing director in NNV, Jan Thomas 
Odegard, the more “action-oriented” local chapters were much easier to 
cooperate with on new issues.  
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6.5 Chapter summary   
Trends of centralization and professionalization has been identified in 
studies that were finished before the organizations made climate change a 
central issue. These trends create tensions between the central and local 
level, and have to a certain degree changed the role of members in the 
organization. As climate change is an issue that has predominantly been 
worked with on the central level, the “localization” of climate change may 
be affected by these existing tensions. They may explain the general 
attitude towards members in the organizations, which have a large central 
office and an at times distanced relationship with their local level. They 
may also explain local resistance towards the central level in general, and 
the climate issue in particular. By most measures, the Danish activists 
should have more resources, more viable forms of local action, and more 
relevant knowledge. However, many of the Danish activists saw their own 
role as unimportant. This is likely connected to the established work forms 
at the local level. The symbiotic relationship to the government through 
hearings is the main source of new issues to work with. For local wielding 
this “hammer”, the climate did not seem sufficiently nail-shaped, being too 
complex and remote to address through the usual channels of influence. 
The Danish activists are more strongly tied to this process than the 
Norwegian counterpart, by having a governmental mandate to protest local 
destruction of nature.  
As we can see, there is a certain generational gap within the organization, 
which is correlated to ideological differences, and largely aligns itself 
along the local/central divide. This may affect the climate issue indirectly 
in at least two ways. Firstly, older activists may know less about climate 
change than younger people who have been educated with climate change 
on their schedule. Secondly, older activists, at least in Norway, may have 
shaped their environmental involvement in opposition to energy 
production, and may therefore be less open to the idea of becoming 
proponents of renewable energy production in the name of climate change. 
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This implies that it is hard to ascribe the current efforts and conditions to 
the issue alone.  
7.0 How do the activists see climate change? 
To be able to address the issue, the local activists need to be aware of it, 
and able to identify climate change-related issues in their local 
communities. However, climate change comes in many shapes. The 
activist’s understanding of climate change is shaped in the context of their 
surroundings, their experiences, and the organization. Here, I will analyze 
different conceptions of climate change among the activists.  
Climate change activism requires knowledge about how the causes and 
effects of climate change may manifest themselves locally. I have already 
discussed how climate change has been constructed, through scientific 
modelling and social processes, as a global issue. For natural scientists, 
climate change can be made visible through visualizations of Global 
Circulation Models, graphs, numbers and text. But it cannot be to the same 
degree as, for example, a poached rhino, garbage in the streets, or an oil 
spill. While melting ice caps and extreme weather events may be attributed 
to climate change, most such examples are either remote (as the ice cap on 
the North Pole), or hard to link directly to climate change. Visibility makes 
a problem more intuitive, and easier to understand.  Thus, we may find 
that issues of greater magnitude creates less involvement than issues which 
are more visible. One example from Norway is the “Monster masts” of 
Hardanger. The building of new power lines along the picturesque (but 
highly polluted) Hardanger fjord caused large protests, and post cards, 
paintings and photographs showing the visible damage to nature was a key 
part of the campaign (Hansen K. , 2012). 
Interpreting local issue takes expertise, a lens or a framework to discern 
and sort local observations. A forest is not just a forest, a windmill is not 
just a windmill, a waterfall is not just a waterfall. One example of a 
charting of such differences can be found in the work of Syse (2001, 
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2010), who contrasts an experienced forester’s view of the forests 
surrounding Oslo with that of local trekkers, and different conceptions of 
landscape and biodiversity between stakeholders in Argyll, Scotland.  
Ella Maria Bisschop-Larsen, president of DN, pointed to the visibility of 
new issues as a key disadvantage in terms of recruitment of new members 
and activists.  
The primary reason for us being bigger in the 70s was that 
the questions we addressed was about visible pollution. I 
mean, you could see it in the water, you could see it in the 
fields, you could see the smoke in the air. Yellow smoke, 
red water by the slaughter houses, the dye plants (laughs). 
Those were visible pollution issues. Today (…) there are 
other kinds of pollution problems, and they are actually 
harder to work with, climate change included. It’s harder 
to communicate non-visible pollution.  
Climate change is not (yet) visible to the local activists. But this does not 
mean that it cannot be comprehended or indirectly visualized. Climate 
change may become visible by proxy, through projections, statistics, or 
through concrete projects connected to mitigation or adaptation efforts. As 
Asdal (2011) argues, quantification of environmental destruction “creates, 
binds and forms structures, they help something become visible, an object 
of policy” (Asdal, 2011, s. 99).  But there is a problem with these “meta-
visializations”: Within the context of ideological differences and internal 
disagreements in the organizations, climate change may also be connected 
to other issues or discussions, and associated with these discussions.  
7.1 Seeing climate change, and making it visible  
Seeing climate change is largely a question of perspective, as the concrete 
effects have yet to materialize in most of the member’s local communities.  
But climate mitigation and adaptation projects could symbolize climate 
change in different ways. Local chapters included climate in the 
understanding of existing local issues, such as road development, 
renewable energy development or forests, but there were also examples of 
novel ways of visualizing the issue.  
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 In the flat peninsula and islands of Denmark, the rising tides were an 
especially clear threat. Both DN and the Danish government has created 
maps and visualizations of how Denmark can be affected by rising sea 
levels, including damages on farmland and loss of area. Local activists 
also incorporated this perspective in their work. In Vestjylland, for 
example, the work to preserve Linfjorden, a local fjord, was seen as both 
an issue of nature preservation and climate adaptation. Local leader John 
Bjerregaard Clausen was worried about the effects of rising oceans:  “We 
focus a lot on climate and the possible rise in sea level, how to think about 
both nature and protection, and include climate and high tides”.  Here, the 
existing preservation efforts were “reframed” in light of climate 
adaptation.  However, some of the activists saw the adaptation efforts in a 
more anthropocentric light, fearing the effects on heavier rains and high 
tides on their local communities. In Nordjylland, the local leader Thorkild 
Kjeldsen pointed to local work to reduce local vulnerability to extreme 
rainfall, and in Østjylland, the leader Søren Høyager argued that the 
regional capital Aarhus is vulnerable: “The center of town is very low (…) 
Part of it is below sea-level. This place will look like Holland unless we 
change our minds.”  Such worries has the potential of making new issues 
visible, as not only nature, but also “civilization” comes under threat.  
In Norway, the “visible” aspects of the climate issue are still 
predominantly mitigation projects. Several of the activists I talked to, 
pointed out that their local work helped making the issue tangible. This 
was the case for the “Oil Free” project. In Sør-Trøndelag, the local 
activists launched the program by displaying a used oil tank on the main 
street in Trondheim According to local leader Steinar Nygard, the 
visibility was a great benefit. “When you see the old, battered oil tank we 
have dug up, you understand that this [energy efficiency] is a question of 
pollution”.   
Another example was a small-scale action by the local chapter in Vest-
Agder. Marthe Ulltveit-Moe, the local leader in Kristiansand had taken a 
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young activist with her at a simple exercise – counting the amount of cars 
entering Kristiansand with only one passenger, so-called “lunch bag 
drivers”, transporting nothing but themselves and their food. The pollution 
from the “lunch bag drivers” was visible to the activists, and the resulting 
statistics were equally visible and understandable by the public. This 
points to an important distinction. While climate change may not be 
directly visible, much of the traditional work of the environmental 
movement has served to make “invisible” issues visible in the form of 
statistics, models or facts. Both through maps of rising sea levels (in 
Denmark), dirty oil tanks, and statistics showing the unnecessary number 
of empty car seats, climate change-related issues are made visible and 
understandable for both the activists and the public at large.  
7.2 Climate change as a (too) global issue  
There were differences in how important the activists saw themselves in 
the climate work of the organization. For many, the “global” qualities of 
the issue made it hard to discern locally. In Norway, a larger portion of the 
local chapters saw themselves as important, but not all. In Rogaland, the 
local leader Erik Thoring saw their chapter as being a “sparrow”, too small 
to make a difference on such a big issue.  In the Oslo and Akershus 
chapter, which include 1/3 of the organization’s members, the local leader 
Gjermund Andersen did concede that the local chapters had a role to play, 
but he also saw the issue as too big and vague to approach, with the 
possible exception of road development.  Speaking about the local work in 
general, she noted that the central level did not seem to prioritize their 
work. The respondent from Finnmark Gunnar Reinholdsen argued that the 
major decisions are made in the national government.  He thought that 
local activism could increase the pressure on then national assembly, but 
that the payoff was small.  
This attitude was more common among the respondents in DN. Four of the 
local leaders argued that the issue was better handled on the national or 
international level, which they did not feel that they could play a part in. 
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As Arne Hastrup from Vestsjælland argued: “We see climate as something 
that is global and not local”. However, he was open for working with 
climate if local issues cropped up.  
Where you might find something, is when something 
happens locally. Wind mills, solar cells concrete projects 
(..). Other than that, it’s very abstract. (…) it’s not enough 
to do something locally, it’s a global problem.   
 
The respondent from Storkøbenhavn, Steen Christiansen, argued along 
similar lines. For Peter Skat Nilsen in Nordsjælland, even the national 
level was seen as insignificant. “Denmark has less than one thousandth of 
the world population (…) I am deeply pessimistic about what can be 
achieved”.  He was split on the issue, arguing that the national and 
international level was the most important, even though he did favor local 
activity. “Initiatives should come from above, that is, from the EU and the 
government”.   
These perspectives resonate with the points Tsing (2005) and Yearley 
(2005) has made, of the general problem with “global” discourses. In this 
case, the pacifying effect of the “global” label seems to be in play.  Even 
though the global problem is no more than an accumulation of local 
processes, the local activists see themselves as insignificant. Such 
sentiments reveal a failure to make the climate issue local, and to create a 
manageable context for their local efforts. The local leader in Vest-Agder, 
Marte Ulltveit-Moe, who was heavily involved in climate change activism, 
argued that the environmental movement had framed the issue in a too 
abstract way.   
I think the climate is two things: it’s ‘high up’ – the 
climate negotiations, the climate goals and so on. Some of 
the local work is also ‘up there’. I was on a seminar with 
the Norwegian Church Aid about climate. It was all ‘up 
there’. Thinking about the children in Africa, we should 
write to our politicians and ask them to cut emissions, and 
things like that. Then there are the emissions that are 
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‘down here’. I think they are the most important. All 
emissions are local. They are from somewhere. All 
emissions are by definition small, all of them. Even a 
Chinese coal plant is a small part of the big problem (…). 
We must get down at the concrete level. That bike, that 
highway, that oil furnace, that train. I feel lonely, because 
too many people talk ‘up there’.   
 
This assessment cuts to the core of the discussion: climate change can be 
visible in many ways. However some of the conceptualizations of climate 
change are not only distant or hard to grasp, they may also cause resistance 
and conflict.  
7.3 Climate change mitigation as a danger to nature  
What happens, for example, when climate change “up there” collides with 
the local environment “down here?” Here, I will look at disagreement 
between the local and the central level over renewable energy in the two 
organizations.  For many of the respondents, climate was not just hard to 
grasp, but also conflicted with local nature preservation work. The Climate 
Change issue is indirectly visible to activists as local destruction of nature, 
eyesores in the cultural landscape and loss of rivers and other ecosystems. 
As we have seen, half of the Norwegian responders, and six of the ten 
Danish responders pointed out that there was conflict between climate 
change and issues they were already working with. The main source of 
such conflict was development of renewable energy. Nine of the 
Norwegian chapters reported that there was conflict between climate 
change and nature preservation on this issue, and six more argued that they 
were critical to the central level on this issue. In Denmark, six of the local 
leaders argued that there was some conflict, and that windmills were the 
main source. However, the conflict in Norway was voiced more loudly by 
several of the Norwegian local leaders, especially leaders in some of the 
largest chapters.    
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Since January 2012, a larger controversy about renewable energy 
production has been sparked connected to the discussion about “green 
certificates”. This a new regulatory program, introduced in January 2012, 
where the Norwegian Government subsidize commercially unviable 
electricity production to boost renewable energy production in Norway. 24 
One official goal of this policy is to export electricity to Europe. The 
program is also connected to the planned “electrification” of Norwegian 
oil platforms, to phase out the small gas-powered generators which power 
them, which would require more power production on land. The result is a 
large increase in development of wind mills, hydro plants and new power 
lines, especially in the western and northern parts of the country. The 
calculations of the climate effect is difficult and contested.  NNV officially 
supports the program, but it has increasingly caused internal conflict, 
especially between the local and the central level.  Climate advisor Holger 
Schaupitz recognized that: “(…) some local activists see it as a danger to a 
waterfall or a piece of undisturbed nature.”   
The development of renewable energy is not evenly distributed among the 
country’s regions. In some regions, where development has been most 
intensive, the local activists felt overwhelmed.  The local leader Ragnhild 
Sandøy in Troms felt that activists could not live with the current situation 
for long. Referring to the large increase in development plans in her 
region, she drew parallels to the old fight against the damming of the Alta 
River. “Today we have a hundred Alta struggles in one region, there’s an 
inflation, and the media doesn’t cover it”.An additional frustration is that 
these projects are subsidized by the government. 
Sandøy argued that the members of the organization were not comfortable 
with climate change as an issue. “What we see is a large gap between 
administration and organization, and perhaps also the central board”. The 
local leaders in Nordland and Finnmark had similar gripes. In Nordland, 
the local leader Erling Solvang said that he “questioned the climate effect” 
                                              
24 The Norwegian Ministry of Oil and Energy (2012) 
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of local energy development, which he branded as “extreme”. In 
Finnmark, the local leader Gunnar Reinholdtsen said that he was critical to 
central policies on electrification, as it meant more power lines and energy 
development, but that they remained loyal to the central line.  
Gjermund Andersen, the leader of the important Oslo and Akershus 
chapter (representing nearly a third of the organization’s total members) 
have been among the strongest voices in this discussion. In his view, 
renewable energy production and nature preservation are more or less 
incompatible goals.  In the local member magazine “Grevlingen” (The 
Badger), Gjermund Andersen criticized the climate-related work as a part 
of a centralization of the organization.  He argued that “green energy” is 
often at edge with these goals locally while “climate emissions is not the 
acute threat to nature”. He pointed out that The Conservation Society’s 
role is different from others, and warns against “riding two horses.”25 The 
debate has also been taken in larger fora: in February of 2013, the Oslo 
chapter arranged a public meeting with the title “Wind power and loss of 
nature or energy conservation and nature conservation?”26 
By attending a meeting of the national board, I was able to see this 
discussion play out among the local leaders and the central board. The 
following account is based on my recording of the meeting. The “green 
certificates” program had come under heavy criticism from several 
experts, and been scrutinized on a documentary on the national TV 
channel NRK in the fall of 2012.27 The documentary caused internal 
debates in the organization via e-mail, especially among regional leaders.28 
The documentary had caused Heidi Sørensen, a previous leader of the 
Conservation Society, to proclaim publicly that she deeply regretted 
supporting the program as a politician.29   
                                              
25 25 From Grevlingen issue 4, 2012 
26 The Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature 2013, web resource 
27 From NRK 2012, TV broadcast  
28 Mentioned in the discussing during the meeting.  
29 Lie (2012) Teknisk Ukeblad, web resource 
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Torstein Bye, one of the most critical experts featured in the documentary, 
was invited to speak at the seminar. In his presentation, he argued against 
the supposed climate effects of the new energy projects. The following 
discussion displayed a large variety of intellectual approaches to the issue. 
While Sunniva Pettersen Eidvoll, member of the central board, argued that 
Norway could help phase out fossil energy in Europe by developing more 
energy production and building a large new cable to the continent, several 
of the regional representatives present expressed doubts that this was 
possible, pointing out that the visiting expert was of the opposite opinion. 
Climate advisor Audun Randen Johnsson from the secretariat argued that 
the electrification would not be accepted if it served to increase oil 
production on the platforms, in which case the climate effect would be 
negated. The meeting did not take shape as a clear division between the 
central and local level. The local activists are also split, with some having 
stronger objections than others. The discussion about green certificates 
was not settled at this meeting, and cut short because of time restraints. 30 
This nature-climate conflict was compounded when local activists were 
confronted with climate-related arguments by developers. As Steinar 
Nygard in Sør-Trøndelag remarked:  
I see people who have never cared about climate change 
before, such as local land owners, who suddenly become 
very concerned about it when they can earn subsidies. 
There’s a hypocrisy which  makes our stomachs turn. 
 
The discussion of forestry and climate has been contentious in several 
regions of Norway, as local foresters have draped themselves in climate 
concerns. In Møre og Romsdal, local leader Øystein Folden was frustrated 
about how local foresters is using climate as a proxy argument. “They 
make plantations and call it climate policy, it’s a recurring theme, with a 
lot of debate surrounding it, and the coastal foresters are pulling the 
strings”.  
                                              
30 Based on recording of the meeting, and the meeting procedures.  
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As in Norway, the main reason for conflict on climate-related issues 
reported by Danish local leaders was local renewable energy production. 
Six of the responders pointed out that this was a source of disagreement. 
However, the disagreement has led to a lower general level of conflict 
between the local and central level, and within the local level, and the 
local responders did not express similar fundamental criticism of the 
central level as they did in Norway.  To mitigate the conflicts that have 
cropped up, the Conservation Society has created a national energy mill 
policy, which mainly argues for placing wind mills at sea, in areas that are 
already industrialized on farmland and along roads, while generally 
arguing against windmill sin protected or vulnerable nature or recreational 
areas. 31 
While the Danish local leaders I interviewed were by far less critical to 
climate efforts than those in Norway, local resistance to renewable energy 
was a general problem in the organization, according to climate advisor 
Jens La Cour.  
 There are some who think that we shouldn’t talk too 
much about the climate, because talk about the climate 
agenda came at the expense of nature. That was largely 
the story in our organization, and a contributing cause of 
resistance.  
 
The central level was no stranger to protesting windmills either. The 
president Ella-Maria Bisschop-Larsen pointed out that a large testing 
facility for new windmills recently had been planned in the middle of a 
national park, a plan DN opposed. As the windmill industry is large, DN 
sees it as an important task to keep them in check.  
However, local renewable energy production has historically been less 
contested in Denmark than in Norway. One reason is that the local 
population has been included in wind mill production in Denmark. The 
environmental movement has since the 70s shaped much of their work 
                                              
31 The Society for Nature Conservation in Denmark 2010 (f) Report 
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through the development of local expertise on the development of wind 
power. This was inspired by the traditional “share ownership movement”, 
a deep-rooted part of the Danish labor movement.  Unlike ordinary shares, 
shares in this kind of enterprise guarantees an equal say in the company.32 
This method of development became popular in windmill construction 
from the 80’s onward. The majority of windmills constructed between 
1984 and 1994 were built through a so-called “windmill guild”. At the 
peak of the movement, as many as 100 000 Danes owned part of a 
windmill.33 The primary conduit for this activity has traditionally been the 
Organization for Renewable Energy (Jamison et al. 1990:104). 
This way of producing renewable energy has been credited as one of the 
reasons why renewable energy production has been met with much less 
opposition in Denmark than in Norway. Moe (2012) argues that 
differences in public opinion is an important factor in the large differences 
in the success of the countries’ windmill industries. While Norwegian 
developers have largely met opposition locally, Danish developers have 
been able to rely on local support (Moe, 2012). 
The local leader in Vestsjælland, Arne Hastrup, pointed out that local 
ownership was key to avoid conflict between renewable energy production 
and concerns for nature. By becoming the owners of their local wind mill, 
protesting activists were turned into climate-conscious local developers, 
and the eyesore and the noise were no longer as perceptible.  “[jokingly] If 
you own a wind mill, you don’t hear the noise as well, you accept the 
disturbance in the landscape”. Hastrup pointed out that two projects in his 
region exemplified this effect. One of them included local activists, and 
went through with few protests. The other “came from high above with a 
big, shiny plan. That’s when trouble arises”. As with the conflict with the 
forestry industry in NNV, climate change mitigation was harder to 
swallow when business interests were behind it, and when local leaders 
                                              
32 From Gyldendals Danske Encyclopedi 2012, web resource  
33 From the Danish Windmill Organization 2012, web resource 
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feel ignored in the process. Context, especially local expertise and the 
level of inclusion and openness in the process colors the perception of 
climate change among local activists.  
7.4 Climate change as a metaphor for the central level  
Issues have connotations, and the stances people can be affected by 
underlying conflicts. One example is a study of the Norwegian conflict 
over wolves, where Sørlie (2001) argues that local inhabitants largely saw 
the local wolf population as a “metaphor for the government”. In NNV, 
the debate about renewable energy exemplify how the issue is, among 
some activists, viewed as a symbol of problematic centralization of the 
organization.  
A key point in the aforementioned criticism from Gjermund Andersen is 
that the central level has come to dominate the organization, and not serve 
the local chapters. “The Conservation Society is you and me, the 
members”, Andersen writes, but he laments that the secretariat - “this 
service, organ” - has “grown out of its role and come to dominate the 
organization” 34  
For Andersen, the climate discussion is part of a larger discussion of the 
professionalization and centralization of the organization. In his interview 
with me, he sketched an overview of how these two issues are related. The 
numbers represent different places the Conservation Society could place 
itself currently. The vertical axis represents nature conservation (up) and 
environmental problems such as pollution and climate change (down). The 
horizontal axis goes from “local” to “central”, indicating degree of 
centralization. Shown in other bubbles are organizations such as the 
Norwegian Trekking Organization (DNT), WWF, Nature and Youth (NU), 
the Future in our Hands (FIVH), Bellona, Zero, the Coordinating Council 
for Biodiversity (SABIMA) and Green Living (MHV). The numbers 
indicate different possible positions he argues that NNV could take. In the 
                                              
34 From «The Badger» issue 4, 2012  
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far top right corner he has drawn his own regional chapter (NOA), as 
“local” and nature-oriented as possible.  
Figure 4Gjermund Andersen's chart of organizational structure and choise of focus 
 
 
Andersen dislikes that the organization is seemingly trying to mimic the 
structure of the Department of Environment, “having an opinion on every 
related topic” instead of “concentrating our efforts on the core activity” 
(meaning nature preservation). In a following article in The Conservation 
Society’s national publication “Natur & Miljø”, called “The climate 
struggle causes confusion”, the following debate was summarized. 
Member of the Central Board Sunniva Pettersen Eidsvoll was “especially 
critical to the emphasis on differences between central organs and the 
organization”, pointing to clear decisions in the political program and 
statements approved by the Yearly Meeting. 35 
As we can see, the climate is here part of a larger discussion about the 
centralization of the organization. While the members of the Climate 
                                              
35 From “Natur og Miljø” issue 6, 2012  
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Network argued that the central level had become too large, and removed 
from the local activists, the Danish local leaders reported less animosity to 
the central level, were more open to their suggestions, and were even 
willing to change their local work to be in line with the organization’s 
national policy. In short, the Danish organization saw less conflict along a 
center-periphery axis.   
A possible explanation for is that this debate is influenced by 
another underlying tension, the Norwegian “local community 
perspective”, which has been described as a “unique” trait of Norwegian 
environmental ideology and culture. Grenstad, Selle and Strømsnes (2006) 
makes an effort to distill this ideology as a brew made up of the country’s  
geography and history. Between 1537 and 1814, Norway was in a union 
under the Danish Crown. Emerging from 400 years of union with 
Denmark, Norwegian nationalists in the 19th century glorified rural society 
and wild nature, building a common sense of national identity (Grendstad 
et al 2006: pp 104-105). “Urban culture, associated with extraterritorial 
(i.e., Danish) clergy, bureaucracy and townsfolk, was alien to the folk 
spirit. It was nature, not culture that was national” (Witoszek 1997, as 
quoted in Grendstad, et al 2006:105) 
 The ideology is defined as a general affinity for rural interests  
“(…in Norway, a local perspective entails that urban interests, at least up 
to the present, play a role secondary to those of the local communities” 
(Grendstad et al 2006:120). This provides a possible explanation for why 
the underlying center-periphery conflict has seemingly had a stronger 
impact on how many of the Norwegian activists perceive a new issue that 
is “handed down” from the central level: climate change.  
It might seem quite paradoxical that a center-periphery conflict would be 
possible between the Oslo and Akershus chapter and the central office, 
given that their offices are no more than a short bike ride apart. However, 
Grenstad et al concludes: “There is no urban effect on the local 
|community perspective” (Grendstad et al:116). As Bortne et al. argues, 
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this ideology is national, and not strictly tied to where people live. Even 
center of Oslo is within walking distance from the forest, and most people 
are tied to the primary sector through family ties (Bortne 2002: 23). The 
differences between the central office and the Oslo and Akershus chapter 
are not necessarily tied to where they reside, but to where they travel: to 
the center of town to lobby politicians, or to the outskirts, to walk in the 
forest. 
7.5 Differing views - the Mejlflak controversy 
If seeing climate change is a matter of perspective, it follows that different 
perspectives may give two interpretations within the organization of the 
same issue, or the same project. A particularly striking example could be 
found in Denmark, where the high population density means that singular 
projects may be literally within eyesight of several local chapters of the 
Conservation Society. In Norway, such conflicts are seldom, as local 
chapters are usually several miles, mountains or fjords apart. This has led 
to a stronger conflict between the center and the periphery, even within the 
organization, as we have seen in the discussion over Green Certificates 
above. In Denmark, the high population density can create conflict 
between different chapters over local issues. The Mejlflak wind park is 
one such example. This planned park of oceanic windmills will be placed 
close to the shore within eyesight of four different local chapters of DN, 
and has caused some internal disagreement.  
The planned Mejlflak wind park is located close to the island Samsø close 
to the bay of the regional center Aarhus. This project was mentioned by 
several of the members of the central leadership as a somewhat 
representative case of the internal conflicts, and the way the organization 
handles them. The Mejlflak project also involves members of the climate 
network. The windmill park was initiated by local activists in the Syddjurs 
chapter (where the leader of the Climate Network, Christian Bundgaard, is 
the leader) located west of Aarhus, facing Samsø. The building of the 
windmills was organized within the tradition from the 1970s.  As a large 
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part of the local undeveloped land was designated as a national park in 
2011, the local chapter suggested creating a wind park in the middle of the 
shallow bay of Aarhus. The park can supply energy to the local area, 
which houses around half a million people. 
The idea was to copy the success of Samsø, where the 6000 inhabitants 
gets all their power off renewable energy. According to one of the 
initiators, Christian Bundgaard (also the leader of the Climate Network) 
local chapter decided to create a windmill partnership, where local 
inhabitants could apply individually to participate in the funding of the 
park. The local activists in Aarhus partnered up with local energy 
companies, which are also owned through a share partnership.  
The Mejlflak project is still disputed through the ongoing implementation 
phase. According to Nina Saarnak, coordinator of local affairs in DN, it 
has split the local chapters in DN. Surprisingly, a slight majority of the 
members in the climate-conscious local chapter at the carbon neutral 
island Samsø opposed the development, on aesthetic grounds. The Aarhus 
chapter approved of it, but the chapter in the eastward municipality of 
Odder opposed it. In Syddjurs, where the project had originated, there 
were also mixed feelings, but they generally approved of the project as 
long as there were small adjustments on the placement. The building can 
be seen as somewhat of a zero-sum game, where all aspects of the 
windmill conflict played in. The wind park that is planned will be built 
between Samsø and the shore, with Syddjurs to the north, Samsø to the 
South, Odder to the West and Aarhus to the northwest. The windmills can 
be seen from all chapters, and a change in location can mean that someone 
else are more bothered by the placement. Aesthetic preferences were 
pitched against each other, as well as the interests of energy consumers in 
the Aarhus area and those who would prefer to keep the horizon clear of 
further disturbances.  The four different chapters had four different 
perspectives on the wind farms. For the chapter in Syddjurs and Aarhus, it 
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represented a local effort to reduce climate emissions. For Odder and 
Samsø, it represented an eyesore.  
The solution to this internal conflict was to use the secretariat as a 
mediator. Saarnak was given the task of creating a common statement on 
behalf of the organization. This was done on the suggestion of the local 
chapters themselves, after fruitless attempts at local cooperation. Saarnak 
received comments from all chapters. She describes her role as something 
similar to a bureaucrat, receiving arguments, but ultimately basing her 
decision on the central policy, as decided by the national assembly. “I tried 
to peel away the many local arguments, and look at what we have decided 
upon, what Danmarks Naturfredningsforening has decided, and 
Denmark’s laws.” However, she did not acknowledge the similarity.  She 
had made the decision “not like a bureaucrat, but based on a policy”. This 
kind of decision-making has become more common within the 
organization, and it is done independently of the local chapters’ actions. 
According to Saarnak, local chapters are positive to this kind of 
involvement from the central level, as local activists had much respect for 
the central leadership and secretariat.  
Making climate change “visible” can in some cases simply be a matter of 
changing perspective. As we have seen, Danish activists can watch the 
same wind park from two sides of a bay, and see either an eyesore or a 
climate solution. 
For some, the climate could even be invisible in their own work. One of 
the respondent that was most pessimistic about local climate work in 
Denmark was Steen Christensen in Copenhagen. He argued that the 
organization should not work with climate change, that the local chapters 
did not play an important role. At the end of the interview, he mentioned a 
local road demonstration that he had joined against a large road project. 
“The protests against the road was both based on concerns for our 
environment and of course on curbing local traffic, so there is some 
climate there”. Here, the local protests could easily be seen as a more or 
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less effective means of curbing local climate emissions, even though the 
local activist initially argued that local climate activism was not feasible.  
7.6 Chapter summary   
This breakdown of different perspectives, show us that “climate change” is 
not a singular issue, and that the local understanding and assessment of the 
issue is largely dependent on context, both geographical and political. The 
conceptualization of Climate change as “global” has led to pessimism 
among many activists about what they can achieve locally. In Norway, 
arguments of nature preservation intermingle with arguments about the 
centralization of the organization. Meanwhile, activists had strikingly 
different perspectives on local climate work, from deeply pessimistic to 
enthusiastic. A small shift of perspective can change the assessment of 
how easy climate change is to work with locally, and whether it is 
compatible with other important issues. A clear pattern is that climate 
arguments are less welcome if they are put forth by commercial actors, or 
if they demand sacrifices that do not seem to benefit the local population. 
As local activist Arne Hastrup pointed out, noise or destruction to 
landscape was more acceptable when local activists owned the windmills 
themselves. The diverging perspectives of the Mejlflak project, from 
different sides of the Aarhus Bay, exemplify this effect.  
8.0 A battle of regimes – or a new synthesis?  
There is a curious difference between the conflicts I have discussed above: 
in Norway, the main conflict over climate issues is between those activists 
and central actors who support renewable energy production and those 
who strongly oppose it. While this conflict is also apparent in Denmark, 
DN also sees as strong conflict between especially climate-conscious 
actors – the Climate Network – and the central level.  Here, I will explore 
how activists’ expertise plays an important role in these conflicts. I will go 
on to look at how a failure to transcend internal differences between old 
and new cognitive regimes may hamper the efforts to make climate change 
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“local”, and point to the examples of new modes of cognitive praxis that 
may bridge this gap.    
What role may activists’ expertise play in climate policy? In many ways, 
activist’s role as experts have been weakened over the past decades, 
especially that which has been developed in the face of new environmental 
problems. Still, local activists has considerable knowledge about the 
environment, and their surroundings, and this discussion would border on 
the paternalistic if it did not include an understanding of the way local 
activists employ their significant knowledge and expertise to assess the 
issue. Climate change can involve compromises that are hard to swallow. 
It may involve cooperation with powerful business interests, or 
governmental agencies. To navigate these waters requires expertise, and 
an understanding of the pros and cons of climate-related development that 
may come at the expense of local biodiversity or natural beauty.   
As mentioned above, environmental politics is a “politics of expertise”. 
This expertise is also necessary on the local level. Grassroots activities are 
no less dependent on some level of understanding of scientific facts than 
lobbyism on the central level. This is especially striking in the widespread 
use of hearings, in which the local activists take the role of local experts. 
This is an important aspect of the local activist’s assessment of climate 
change. It is also a central aspect of the two major conflicts I have charted 
connected to the climate issue in the two organizations: the resistance to 
wind mills in both countries (stronger in Norway) and the conflict between 
the Climate Network at the central level in Denmark.  
8.1 Proud local experts   
Let us first return to the conflict over renewable energy. The phrasing of 
climate advisor Jens La Cour in Denmark – that the resistance to 
windmills at the local level is “kneejerk”.36 While the organization 
underlines the wisdom of their members, this phrasing reveals a certain 
understanding of the local activists as less knowledge- or expertise-based 
                                              
36 His Danish phrasing was “ritual”, but he agreed to this translation.  
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than the central level. It resembles the idea of local protest as based in a 
“Not in my back yard”- mentality (NIMBY). NIMBY was coined as a 
derogatory moniker for American local activists, this abbreviation was 
later appropriated as a positive slogan. (Dowie 199:131) However, as 
several studies have shown, NIMBY is a simplistic explanation of local 
resistance, which underplays local understanding, and the complex reasons 
for why people resist local development (Horst 2007) (Walker 1995) 
(Kraft & Clar1991).  In the case of local apprehension towards renewable 
energy projects y within the two organization, it is largely based on an 
honest assessment of the trade-off between local nature and climate 
mitigation. However, this calculation may be slightly skewed by the 
imbalance in local expertise, between “new” and “old” issues.   
Firstly, we may note that none of the responders in either country reported 
that they lacked general knowledge about the issue of climate change, with 
the possible exception of Troms in Norway, where the local leader argued 
that emissions from volcanoes outweigh human emissions. (RS) In 
Norway, there had been one recent instance of outright denial of climate 
change as an issue, from a representative on the Yearly Meeting in 2010, 
but this argument gained little traction, according to climate advisor 
Holger Schaupitz: “My impression was that most of us saw that as a 
strange statement”. In addition, it is worth noting that all respondents but 
one argued that the local chapters were important in the organization’s 
work with climate change.   
What was perceived as lacking was knowledge about the actual climate 
effect of local policy, and practical ways of impacting it. Similar 
statements came from Danish activists. “If we were to work with this, it’s 
not something we could easily do. Anette Ugleberg in Sydjylland argued 
that, “We would need guidance or something…about what significance it 
would have (…) it’s hard to take action without a certain level of 
knowledge” This also made it hard to enter local discussions, even when 
the climate is on the agenda. Several of the activists argued that they did 
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not think they had enough knowledge on the issue. Kurt Due Johansen in 
Fyn was not optimistic about their local expertise. “[climate change], 
that’s something the central element must deal with. I do not think we can 
handle it. You need professional people, who have the necessary insight”.  
Lack of local climate knowledge was also seen as an important reason for 
why the Climate Municipality project did not involve many of the activist, 
according to project coordinator Jens La Cour. 
 Our local activists cannot act as advisors, and they dnot 
have the resources to call the local administration four 
times a day to check up on their work. They can celebrate 
positive examples (…). But they aren’t actors in any way.  
 
Similar sentiments were voiced in Norway. Per Klunderud in Buskerud 
was hesitant to approach the issue.  
The climate is a hard issue to get a grasp on. The experts 
are fighting tooth and nail, especially on CO2 binding of 
forests. For us, in a forested region, it’s hard to enter those 
discussions without expertise. 
   
Klunderud also argued that the local forestry sector was hard to criticize.  
For me, as a farmer - I read some of the forest industry 
which has really taken this issue, and use CO2-arguments 
for all they’re worth – but I think, we haven’t’ known 
about this for very long. How can they be so sure? This 
has been studied for three, maybe five years. There are no 
eternal truths. There are problems connected to keeping a 
reasonable discourse on some fields. You need to keep 
your facts straight. It’s important that the Conservation 
society is seen as objective.   
 
In both organizations, there were efforts to increase knowledge about 
climate change through internal seminars. In Norway, several of the 
activists reported that it was harder to attend seminars because of the 
larger distance to the capital. According to Nils Tore Skogland in 
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Hordaland, the organization's internal seminars did not include enough 
information about more proactive forms of environmental work, and was 
too focused on teaching members how to make politicians change their 
minds by using media pressure. In Denmark, the respondents were 
generally pleased with the seminars offered through the “nature school” 
program. This program includes a smorgasbord of courses that activists 
may attend, and these include basic leadership training and courses on 
climate change, mainly focused on adaptation. As the activists may choose 
which seminars to attend, far from all had chosen the seminars related to 
climate change. According to organizational secretary Steinar Alsos, NNV 
plans a similar program.   
The local unease with climate change work cannot only be attributed to  
lack of knowledge. Rather, there is an imbalance in the knowledge at the 
local level. Local activists reported that they were unsure about the actual 
climate effect of local projects, while their knowledge about the effects on 
local nature can be extensive, and more thorough than that of the political 
leadership and secretariat at the central office. 
In both organizations, local leaders showed pride in their local knowledge. 
In Denmark, the leader in Storstrøm Michael Løvendal Kruse argued that, 
“Many of our local activists are people with impressive expertise and a lot 
of knowledge, sometimes even more than the professionals”. In Norway, 
the local responders had similar attitudes, but they formulated them 
differently: several of the responders made a point out of the difference 
between themselves and the central level, indicating that the local 
expertise was seen as a counterweight to the climate expertise at the 
central level. In the Norwegian region of Rogaland, for example, where 
there have been several conflicts over wind power plants, the local leader 
Erik Thoring argued that they had much more expertise on the effects of 
these local developments than the central office. The local chapter arrange 
weekly talks on issues of nature conservation, mainly on biodiversity.  
   
110 
 
Similarly, the Gjermund Andersen of the powerful Oslo and Akershus 
chapter pointed out that local activists had extensive knowledge on the 
local topics they are currently working with. He pointed to their local 
expertise on forestry issues, built up over decades of struggle for the 
forests surrounding the nation’s capital. In his view, more of the 
organization’s resources should be devoted to strengthening and this local 
expertise, instead of taking on new tasks on the central level. 
(…) Talk to the activists in Oppland about cabin 
development in the mountains, no one knows more about 
it than then. Talk to the activists in Nordland about the 
plantations of Sikta spruce along the coast, they have 
immense knowledge. Talk to the activists in Hedmark 
about the forest! (...) All of the regional chapters have 
their expert knowledge. Why can’t they receive resources 
to work on behalf of the organization, instead of us having 
one person on the same issue on the central level, far 
removed from the actual reality which surrounds us?   
 
This accumulated knowledge is not always transferrable to new issues, and 
gives local activist incentives to stick to the issues they know most about. 
It may also skew their assessment when climate change concerns must be 
squared with local biodiversity, as seen in the discussion over windmills. 
Gjermund Andersen underlined that their regional activity plan was 
“chemically free of climate change”.  
If the assessments of local projects were made objectively on a case-by-
case basis, we would expect more conflict in Denmark, where the potential 
damage to landscape and nature is greater. There are precious few areas of 
wild nature, and these areas are often the cheapest spots for new 
windmills. In Norway, there is more space for windmills, and less damage 
to the total area of unspoiled nature, relatively speaking. However, the 
climate benefits of local windmills are easier to understand in Denmark. 
Danish environmentalists can be relatively certain that new renewable 
energy will contribute to phasing out domestic fossil fuel consumption. 
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This argument is harder to make in Norway, where the domestic electricity 
production is already predominantly renewable. In addition, NNV’s 
history is largely based on protests against renewable energy projects, 
through the heated struggle against hydro projects in the 70s and 80s.  
The conflict over the “green certificates” exemplify this problem. The 
increased amount of local development is harder to accept when the 
climate effect is unclear. Activists must weigh their existing expertise on 
local nature preservation against a climate argument that experts are still 
arguing over, and with several unknowns. To know the actual climate 
effect of a local windmill or power line, a local activist may have to trust 
that the power is not additional to fossil power and that it does not increase 
oil production if it is used on platforms. This is hard to prove, as it 
depends on several other difficult questions. Is the European climate 
emission trading scheme actually working? Does Norway have enough 
capacity to export the energy? Will excess gas that is not used for 
electricity production on the oil platforms will replace more polluting 
sources of energy if it is exported? These are questions that still puzzle 
experts and politicians.  
This conflict is not unique to climate change. As Yearley (2005) argues, 
science is not an easy weapon to wield. Experts may differ in their 
analysis, and industry may easily counter scientific arguments with their 
own reports or scientists. Last, but not least, the legitimacy of science can 
be undermined by industry advocates, or even by environmentalists 
themselves (Yearley 2005:143). In the difficult discussions about the 
“green certificates” program, NNV risk being put in the same difficult 
position as environmentalists in the UK, which gradually found 
themselves at the “wrong side” of science, as new information about 
GMOs and nuclear transport was brought to the table (Yearley 2005: 
122,173). Science can be an “unreliable friend”, especially when it is not 
rooted in local experiences, but in scientific findings that may be 
contested, reframed or disproven. If the arguments against the climate 
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effect of green certificates are true, it will severely weaken the main 
argument for the organization’s support for the program.  
In this perspective, it is not surprising that the most successful examples of 
local work  in both countries is related to issues that are easily compatible 
with existing knowledge about nature, and where the climate effect is 
clear, such as road development and energy conservation. In both 
countries, transportation was mentioned as an important local climate-
related issue among several of the activists, and the Norwegian “Oil Free” 
campaign promotes energy conservation. For the local leader in Sør-
Trøndelag Steinar Nygard, who was generally positive to local climate 
work, energy conservation was clearly superior to local renewable power 
development.  
When we see the green certificates and the wind mills, we 
think it’s a bad way of getting renewable energy (…) it’s 
a huge waste of nature. 
 
While this and other issues were hard to gauge the climate effect of, most 
local activist had an easier time working with transportation-related issues. 
Here, they would even be willing to “sacrifice” conservation concerns on 
behalf of climate issues. The key was knowing the effect. As Hege Sjølie 
from Hedmark argued:  
When they upgrade the railway, we know that I will 
impact the beachfront, and we’re not too fond of the 
chosen path of the railway lines (…) but we know that it 
will make a positive impact on greenhouse gas emissions. 
With wind power (…) we’re unsure about whether the 
gains outweigh the losses. The sacrifice might seem too 
big, it takes a different dimension.  
 
This quote shows us that the local opposition to windmill may be neither 
“kneejerk” NIMBY-like behavior as the Danish climate advisor Jens La 
Cour hinted at. Nor is it necessarily based on poor understanding. Rather, 
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the local opposition involves an honest assessment of gains and losses, 
pros and cons.  
8.2 What forms of expertise counts in climate policy?   
The activist’s local knowledge may count in the local leader’s choice of 
local activities. But is it of any use for the organization in general? Both 
organizations are democratic, and policies and important statements are, as 
a rule, discussed and voted upon either at the national assemblies or in the 
national board. Still, there are signs that the central level does not value 
the local activist’s expertise on climate-related issues. I will here delve 
into two examples, one from each country.  
In Denmark, the Climate Network’s conflict with the central level was 
largely based on indignation over being ignored by the central level as 
sources of knowledge and information. During the Climate Network 
seminar I attended, one of the local activists, Palle Marcher from 
Copenhagen, tried to raise the issue of light rail development as an 
alternative to new highways. The representative from the Secretariat, 
Janne Wichard Henriksen, cut the discussion short, arguing that this was 
not on the agenda, and that the light rail plans were in any case not 
politically viable. 37 After Janne had left, the coordinating committee of 
the Network discussed the event. The leader Christian Bundgaard was 
strongly critical: 
You could hear it from Janne there, on our meeting, that 
she felt as if…as if we went too far in coming up with 
proposals that were too concrete. (…) We’re not supposed 
to intervene, that’s something they’re supposed to figure 
out in there, you know. They’re in what we call an ivory 
tower. We’re the ones living out here in reality, and see 
what really happens.   
   
The local activists in the network were especially irked about not being 
included in the organization’s scientific committees. The scientific 
                                              
37 Based on recordings from a meeting in the Climate Network 1.12.2012 
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committees are appointed by the central committee, based on their 
expertise. They have to be members of the organizations, but do not have 
to be active. While the committees were previously responsible for 
drafting the organization’s policies, this is now done by the secretariat. 
However, the committees play an important role in advising the central 
commission, through a representative, and give their opinion on policy 
suggestions from the secretariat. According to the leader of the 
Environment committee Sine Beuse Fauerby, the Climate Network could 
also revise policy, but had chosen not to do so. She acknowledged that the 
Climate Network did not seem to be content in their role, and rather 
wanted to fill the role of a scientific committee themselves. During the 
meeting I attended, the aforementioned network member Palle Marcher 
did indeed forward a suggestion to form additional scientific committees, 
to increase local member’s scientific input to the organization’s political 
leadership. 38 
While these local activists are not in opposition to the climate work of the 
central level, they are largely aggravated because they feel that their local 
experience and expertise is ignored. The local activists want to use the 
network as a channel for influencing the organization’s national policies, 
while the central level wants the network to be a channel for disseminating 
information in a more top-down or horizontal manner.  
A Norwegian example points to similar sentiments from the Norwegian 
central level. The organization is in the process of launching a new 
program involving activists in their climate work. The “climate 
ambassador” program, launched in spring 2013, engages volunteers to 
hold talks on Norwegian schools on climate issues. As the program is still 
in the initiating phase, I did not include it in the overview above. 
According to project coordinator Audun Randen Johnsson, the handful of 
ambassadors are mainly recruited from the leadership of Nature and 
                                              
38 Based on a recording of a meeting in the Climate Network’s coordinating committee, 
1.12.2012  
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Youth, which already has a similar program in place. They are 
“ambassadors” in the sense that they present the organization’s analysis 
and policy on climate change, and the program is part of an effort to 
increase recruitment both to the Conservation Society and Nature and 
Youth.   
 The central leadership is wary that this role should not collide with the 
local chapter’s work. As the ambassadors will often hold talks in 
municipalities where the Conservation Society has local chapters, the 
leadership wants to avoid any possible conflict between the message and 
the local chapter’s policies. As climate advisor Holger Schaupitz argued:  
…they won’t be able to run around and have all sorts of 
opinions on issues in spite of the local chapters, that they 
should be asked about that road or this energy project or 
whether we should place new houses over there. That 
kind of stuff will still be done in the ordinary structure.   
The training and coordination of the ambassadors is done by the central 
level, and the title of the program sums up their role in the organizations. 
The ambassadors, unlike the local chapters, would not have much 
autonomy. They represent the central level’s policies, and must heed the 
balancing act between local and central concerns.  
As we have seen above, the central level are wary of having “loose 
cannons” on the deck when it comes to climate policy. Both the Climate 
Network and the Climate Ambassadors are set in roles dictated by the 
central level. This is understandable from a simple organizational point of 
view – a democratic structure requires reverence for democratic decisions. 
However, we may ask whether this pattern is stronger when it comes to 
climate policy than other issues. The established model of climate policy, 
negotiated on the top level and handed down, may have been replicated 
more or less consciously within the organizations. The central level is 
worried about deals that have been struck, compromises that must be 
made. My material does not open up for a comparison between issues and 
fields of work. However, the central level’s apprehension towards local 
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climate initiative and engagement in keeping climate initiative “in line” 
may suggest that some of the “bottleneck” effect charted by Victor (2011) 
in international politics may have been replicated within the organizations.  
Members are seen as important sources of legitimacy and as local 
enforcers of the organization’s policies, but less important as sources of 
experience and expertise that may be of use in the central organization’s 
climate work.  
8.3 A battle of regimes?    
Here, I will discuss the findings above in light of Jamison’s “regimes of 
sustainability”. Jamison (2001) points out that, “One of the main problems 
[with the environmental movement] is that the different strategies tend to 
compete for resources and influence” (Jamison 2001:179). This is true 
within the environmental movement, but may also be true within core 
organizations that embody both “residual”, “dominant” and “emerging” 
regimes.  
In windmill discussions in particular, several of the local chapters present 
arguments from the “residual” understanding of environmental action. 
They react to local renewable energy development through traditionalist 
resistance, based on factual or lay knowledge about local biodiversity and 
cultural landscape. Meanwhile, the central level are strongly marked by 
the “dominant” cognitive regime. In the discussion over renewable energy, 
the central level has accepted a trade-off between climate change and local 
nature, based on a scientific/managerial understanding of how local 
environmental organizations. These decisions have been anchored in 
democratic decisions, but this agreement is vulnerable as local activists see 
the plan set into action, and react using their “residual” modes of 
resistance to local destruction of nature.  
In Denmark, this conflict is more toned down, and most chapters seem 
content with the organization’s compromises on windmills. In addition DN 
has formulated their general climate policy in a more “residual” 
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framework of nature conservation, and the efforts on the central level 
constitute a much smaller amount of the organization’s central level. In 
Norway, the climate issue has to a stronger degree been approached within 
the dominant, centralized and professionalized cognitive regime. The 
central level has also been important participants in transnational forms of 
agency on the climate issue, taking a strong role in international climate 
process. This may partly explain why the issue has caused a larger divide 
between climate-oriented actors and the more nature-oriented members. 
Such internal disagreements can be damaging to mainstream 
organizations, if they are not properly addressed. A similar conflict 
fostered an all-out rebellion in the ranks of the American Sierra Club in 
the early 1990’s, between several important local chapters and the central 
level over forestry issues (Dowie, 1996:216-218). 
8.4 Where should climate activism come from?  
But Jamison assumes the emergence of a synthetic regime, where old and 
new modes of social action, agency and knowledge production are 
combined. Both NNV and DN should in principle be well equipped for 
this, as they embody both residual and dominant cognitive approaches to 
environmental issues.   
Here, we may return to the qualities of the issue as a possible explanation: 
Fostering local climate change activism, involves a certain reversal of the 
dynamic of the conservation societies. While nature preservation has often 
been a way to set local concerns in a national and international context, 
climate change is an international and national issue that must be put in a 
local context if the organizations wants to utilize their large local presence. 
But the danger is that this reversal creates resistance or even refusal from 
the local activists.  
As Jamison (2001) points out, the many environmental organizations that 
predated the second wave, and “embody ‘residual’ cultural formations”, 
wield a double-edged sword. They “may build upon their traditional 
knowledge in their contemporary activities”, but also face difficulties 
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when they try to “escape from the limits of their histories, to transcend 
their traditions” (Jamison 2001:158). As we have seen, this remains a 
challenge. The stable, but highly “reactive” quality of local work through 
hearings may make it harder for local chapters to approach climate change 
locally, and the instances of conflict between local and central actors has 
sharpened over the past years in the Norwegian case.  
There are also clear signs that it will be hard to facilitate such a synthesis 
from the top down, due to the very nature of volunteerism. As we have 
seen, the leadership in DN were uneasy about “pushing” the “Climate 
Municipalities” program on local chapters. Lars Haltbrekken, the president 
of NNV, also argued it was hard to implement local climate activism from 
“above”. “(…) Partly out of respect for what people have engaged 
themselves in, issues that engage people locally, we have been a bit careful 
about pushing this.”  Gjermund Andersen, the respondent from Oslo and 
Akershus underlined this point:   
 I’ve been the leader of a local chapter, and I know that 
nothing is more irritating than when someone suggests 
what we should work with, who knows better about what 
we should do locally. It doesn’t work.   
 
Arguing that local members has joined the organization because they care 
strongly about local nature, Andersen saw it as unnatural to be “taught” 
what to work with.  
If 80 percent of the members have joined the 
organizations because of nature, it’s not unreasonable that 
we should strike a balance.  
 
This point to the problems with trying to inspire grassroots activity from 
above, through seminars or information campaigns. The issues that local 
activists develop expertise about are chosen based on several non-
scientific criteria, such as personal interests and background. Pointing out 
the strong impact of British ornithologists, Yearley (2005) comments that 
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“it was not scientific reasoning which led the group to work for birds 
rather than field mice and voles” (Yearley 2005:140).  In other words, 
Science 
(…) is not a sufficient guide to what conservation groups 
should concentrate on and prioritize; nor, often, does 
science provide the member’s reasons for engaging in 
conservation activities (Yearley 2005:140). 
This suggests that fostering climate change activism must involve more 
than just supporting or encouraging current efforts. The organizations 
cannot rely on fanning the flame if there is no local spark. Still, this does 
not mean that scientific and/or abstract concepts cannot in itself be a spark 
for activism. The question is whether the environmental movement is able 
to foster modes of cognitive praxis that gives activists a way of levelling 
with science from “up there”, to create local expertise and understandings 
“down here” which may supplement or underpin new knowledge of 
climate mitigation and adaptation.  
8.5 Emerging forms of cognitive praxis 
It is now time to turn to the sparks and flames that do exist at the local 
level. Here, I will go deeper into a few examples of climate activism 
presented by my respondents.  For many of the activists, the issues 
themselves were the greatest source of expertise. Through practical work, 
they increased their knowledge, did research on their own, made new 
connections. In my interviews, I assumed that internal training was 
important, and asked about this. While seminars, discussion and talks were 
important, several of the activists pointed out that this was not the main 
source of knowledge. As Tormod Svartdal, leader in Telemark, Norway 
argued: “In a nutshell, we educate ourselves by working with issues and 
being local leaders”.  
According to Eyerman and Jamison (1991), the “cognitive praxis” of 
social movements involves a democratization of science in at least two 
important ways: by “transforming everyday knowledge into professional 
knowledge and, perhaps even more importantly, in providing new contexts 
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for the reinterpretation of professional knowledge.” (Eyerman & Jamison 
1991:52) As it adopts climate change, the environmental movement may 
play an important role both in transforming and translating climate-related 
knowledge both “upwards” and “downwards” through their activities.  
The most successful examples of climate activism does indeed seem to be 
those that reinforce or create forms of local cognitive praxis. Here, I will 
go into three examples from the two organizations. The first is based on 
local climate vulnerability, and including climate change in existing work. 
The second is creating new forms of high-competence activism. The third 
is creating simpler, accessible forms of climate activism.  As we can see, 
local expertise can at times become an obstacle to climate activism, when 
issues “collide”. The opposite effect can be observed when local climate 
work is harmonized with existing expertise, creating a synthesis of 
“residual” and “dominant” cognitive regimes.  
In Denmark, the prime example found in my interviews was climate 
adaptation. On this issue, the organization has largely re-framed their 
existing efforts to protect local nature as a means of climate adaptation.  
Large areas of continuous nature will be better equipped 
against the climate problems than small, scattered areas. 
We shall help and adapt nature to the climate challenges. 
39 
As we can see, the main focus remains on protecting nature from climate 
change. In other words, these efforts do not necessarily do much to shift 
the perspective of the organization or its activists.  
Climate adaptation has been a key to combining new and old expertise. 
The organization’s existing work with nature preservation is held forth as 
an important part of the organization’s climate work. Larger areas of 
preserved nature is both seen as important to increase natural resilience 
towards climate change, in case of extreme rainfall or rising oceans, and as 
a way of protecting human interests.  
                                              
39 The Danish Society for Nature Conservation (2012) Web resource 
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Two Norwegian examples may be better fit to show examples of climate-
related cognitive praxis within the environmental movement. The fact that 
these are both Norwegian may be because NNV is stronger involved with 
climate change work. It may also be caused by the inherent Norway-
centric biases of this study, detailed in the method chapter.  
Firstly, the “oil free”-project has created a new channel for climate 
activism in several Norwegian local chapters, primarily in the larger cities 
such as Kristiansand Trondheim and Bergen, where the project originated. 
The project has served to increase internal expertise and give local 
activists a new perspective on their local communities. The local leaders 
that have adopted the campaign describe it as successful. In Trondheim, an 
information meeting about energy efficiency generated so much interest 
that the venue was packed, according to local leader Steinar Nygard. He 
pointed out that the program was easy for people to understand. “When it 
concerns your living room, you understand the issue on more of a ground 
level”.  
Another clear benefit was that the program served to increase the local 
activist’s expertise both by connecting them to local businesses working 
with energy preservation, and with the local populace. The project has 
won the local chapter in Hordaland an award from the local industry, and 
external and internal funding made it possible to have two full-time 
employees working with energy preservation locally. The initiator Nils 
Tore Skogland saw the work as self-reinforcing “It’s fun to work this way. 
You make new experiences during the work, and you share it with others 
who start up, then you develop the concept further”. This form of activity 
fits with the “emerging”, synthetic cognitive regime imagined by Jamison 
(2001). The local chapters have successfully carved out a role as a meeting 
grounds between experts, the public and local business interests.  
The Oil Free project, as climate adaptation, is more readily compatible 
with   activist’s existing expertise, as it concerns energy conservation, and 
not the more problematic issue of local development and possible 
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destruction of nature. It is also in line with the traditional worldview of 
environmental activists. Steinar Nygard, the local leader in Sør-Trøndelag 
pointed to their relatively newly established energy and climate group, 
which focused on energy conservation, referred to at the local and central 
level as “white certificates”.  While green certificates have created conflict 
between local and central actors, such “white certificates” are more 
compatible with the established ideology and expertise of local activists. 
The originator of the project, Nils Tore Skogland in Hordaland, pointed 
out that the program was based on core principles in the organization, 
developed as early as 1974. “So far, increasing the production has not 
worked. We need to reduce consumption”. In addition, the project has 
been introduced within the existing organizational structure, and 
harmonizes with the ideal of autonomous local chapters working with 
issues on their own accord, with support from the central level.  
The second example is the “lunch bag driver” action in Vest-Agder, 
Norway. The local leader argued that climate action fostered new ways of 
thinking, and new expertise, which increased their engagement in the 
issue. The action is not only a media gimmick, but a form of lay science, 
which did not require extensive knowledge. Through the action, local 
activists produced new statistics, which could be used as political 
ammunition in the local discussions over road development, and 
strengthened their own understanding of local climate pollution. This was 
clear in local leader Marte Ulltveit-Moes own assessment:  
Afterwards [the younger activist] told me that she had 
learned much more from that than from a seminar in 
political science.  
 
Thus, we may Yearley’s point on its head:  Science may not offer concrete 
forms of action, but concrete action can be a gateway to science, as 
Jamisons “cognitive praxis” model implies. The local activists are 
performing activities that the central level would not be able to do. Their 
local expertise becomes a valuable asset in the national struggle against 
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increased emissions from road construction.  Simple forms of local 
activity can provide the spark for further climate action, and create self-
reinforcing local activism that inspires further autonomous grassroots 
activity. In my interview with Ulltveit Moe, she discussed how they had 
branched out their activity to include several innovative forms of activism, 
from setting up climate-related plays to arranging oil-themed dinner 
parties and launching a campaign to eat locally produced food.   
It is interesting to note that NNV has “outsourced” at least one possible 
source of “cognitive praxis”: the establishment of the quasi-governmental 
organization “The green home guard” (now “Green living”) in 1991, 
pushed environmental improvements on the “home front” out of the 
program. According to former managing Director Jan Thomas Odegard, 
the organization has largely become depoliticized. Climate advisor Audun 
Randen Johnsen jokingly argued that “every time we’ve had a good idea, 
we’ve started a new organization”. Odegard argued that this strategy may 
be changing, pointing out that “Oil free” was more similar to the work 
Green Living was founded to do.  
Reviewing the discussion of “cognitive regimes”, as outlined by Jamison 
(2001), The three examples above show signs of a possible emerging form 
of synthetic climate activism, embodying both the “residual” and the 
“dominant” regimes of cognitive praxis. If such programs and local 
initiatives are supported by the central level, they may help bridge the 
current gap between the central and local level in both countries, and 
broaden the organization’s impact on climate change.  
But such a strategy may involve difficult choices, and possibly weaken the 
impact on the national level. An example of this, could be found in 
Denmark. The traditional Danish wind mill partnerships have been held 
forth as a typical example of the green movement’s “cognitive praxis” 
during and following the second green wave. The partnerships have 
traditionally strengthened local environmentalists. The windmill 
partnership movement “provided a temporary space for experimentation 
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with new ‘modes’ of knowledge production that had both cosmological, 
technological and organizational dimensions” (Jamison & Baark 
1999:210).  We would expect this to be a great asset to DN, and a possible 
bridge between the local and the central level on climate issues. A 
surprising find was that five such projects had, in the eyes of some local 
activists, been undermined by the central level.  
This is the account of the incident as recounted by Christian Bundgaard: 
Several similar windmill partnerships:  in Øresund outside of Copenhagen, 
in Sunneberg in Sydjylland, on Bornholm and Skjælland. The six local 
initiatives contacted the Danish Parliament’s Energy Commission, and 
asked for financial support for these plans, to make it economically 
feasible to build the projects at sea instead of on land. Shortly after the 
project had been submitted for approval, there was a change of 
government.  The Department of Finance decided that the planned projects 
in Øresund, Sunneberg, Sydjylland, Bornholm and Skjælland would be too 
expensive, and cut the funds. A new assessment of wind mill projects were 
initiated from the government, performed by a consulting firm. They 
argued that the most cost-efficient placement would be along the west 
coast, where there is more wind. As Mejlflak had been submitted and 
approved before the five others, it was not cancelled.   
The local activists disagreed with the way the calculations were done, and 
wanted the central organization to fight for the projects that they had 
proposed based on the tradition of local windmill partnerships. According 
to initiator Christian Bundgaard, the central leadership and secretariat did 
little to stop this.   
We tried to stop them several times, and they at least 
made clear that they did not oppose the local projects, but 
that’s no real statement, you know. It’s not…they had 
planted the idea that you could put these projects out to 
the highest bidder, you know. The conservative parties 
were eager to embrace the idea (…).  
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The windmill partnership behind the Mejlflak project had been the first to 
send in an official application for money, and was approved before the 
change in government, but the other projects were scrapped.  Bundgaard 
was strongly critical to the line from the central leadership, pointing out 
the narrow understanding of the benefits and costs of windmill projects 
that underpinned the consultant firm’s calculations. “You’re only 
supposed to look at where the wind is strongest, err…to build. The 
concern for local nature, even in Copenhagen, was not included. It’s a 
grotesque way of making assessments”. He largely interpreted this as a 
result of the central level being more in tune with the government 
bureaucrats than the local activists.  
The secretariat has taken the power, and they (…) have an 
idea about, I mean, that ‘now, you know, we are working 
with some people at the ministry at Christiansborg, who, I 
mean…we’ll invite them over and convince them to make 
the changes. (…)  
 
It is hard to say whether large protests against the government’s use of a 
consultancy firm would have made a big difference, but the trade-off 
between local initiative and central deal making seems clear. This may be 
because this form of work has traditionally been the domain of the 
Organization for Renewable Energy. Still, windmill partnerships are one 
example of local action and expertise that cannot be replicated at the 
central level, and could potentially help fulfill the organization’s energy 
policy.  It could also serve to energize local chapters hesitant to accept an 
increased pace of windmill development. Instead of strengthening an 
established form of cognitive praxis, the central level has ceded the 
expertise on wind mills to professional actors that perform their 
calculations based on narrow, economic criteria.  
A transition to a new, cognitive “synthesis” does not just require 
innovation on the local level, but also that the actors at the central level are 
in tune with established forms of local cognitive praxis which may 
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strengthen the organization’s overall goals. But this would possibly mean 
forfeiting or prioritizing down channels of influence on the central level. 
Climate advisor Jens La Cour pointed out that a running dialogue with 
national politicians was an important part of their current policy, and that 
this could be lost if activists such as those in the Climate Network did not 
follow the democratically agreed-upon policy.  If the organizations are not 
willing to make such a trade-off, further adoption of the climate issue is 
likely to further debilitate the organization’s mobilization potential, 
possibly weakening their impact on climate change in the long run, in 
addition to increasing internal conflict when climate change-related efforts 
are at odds with nature preservation.  
8.6 Chapter summary  
While the central level in both organizations largely perceive their activists 
“customers” of their “products” in term of activism, the local leaders are 
proud of their own expertise, and ability to understand issues and take 
action on their own initiative. Acknowledging this, makes it possible to 
move beyond simplistic interpretations of the choices local activists make, 
and the conflicts that may arise. When the central level is not sensitive to 
the importance of local inclusion and established local expertise and forms 
of cognitive praxis, they turn renewable energy into a local problem, not a 
local solution. This is especially striking when compared to the amicable 
cooperation between the central and local level in Denmark over the “Oil 
Free” initiative. Here, the central level has supported and encouraged a 
form of local expertise and capacity building. A clear challenge in 
fostering climate change activism, is that there may be fewer “sparks” for 
climate engagement in local communities, compared to how many nature-
related activities can lead to a political involvement in nature preservation. 
One possible entrance may be climate vulnerability, as witnessed in the 
Danish climate adaptation efforts. Another is to encourage simple 
activities that makes climate change visible and understandable, new 
forms of “cognitive praxis”, which may cast the local activists in more 
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autonomous roles, utilizing their local presence and honing their local 
expertise.  
9.0 Conclusion 
Both the organizations I have looked at have ramped up their climate 
efforts in recent years, though the Norwegian organization spend more 
resources in the issue than the Danish counterpart does. If fostering 
climate activism at the local level is like “teaching an old dog a new trick”, 
as the organizational secretary of DN argued, we may ask what is needed 
to increase local climate change-related activity? Should they change the 
dog or change the trick? Or have they simply barked up the wrong tree?  
The responses suggest that there are several ways to increase local climate 
activity, and that such efforts can be self-reinforcing. Looking at both the 
positive and negative experiences mentioned by my respondents, I have 
found several important factors in facilitating local climate activities.  
- The local climate issue is visible and easy to understand.  
- That local leaders and activists have the expertise to identify local 
climate issues, fostering further “discovery” and understanding of 
local climate issues.  
- That climate change-related efforts do not collide with existing 
expertise, and unavoidable instances are handled in a way that 
includes the local activists.  
- That the climate-related activities and forms of cognitive praxis 
offer autonomy and facilitates further learning and capacity 
building.  
An important, if not surprising find, is that the most committed local 
climate activists were engaged in locally initiated projects. While it is 
understandable that the central level of the organization want to offer 
activities to their members, the idea of the activists as “customers”, most 
prevalent in the Danish organization, may miss central aspects of local 
environmental activism. The most committed activists had the means of 
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production of their own activities, whether it was building a local 
windmill, or increasing the awareness of energy conservation. Climate 
change may indeed be “localized” as it has already been “globalized”, and 
that such a transformation may be facilitated within the two first-wave 
organizations I have studied.  
Another find is that the organizations’ inclusion and influence in 
governmental processes, built up over decades, may weaken the ability to 
address climate change at the local level. This is most visible in the local 
dependency on the hearing process. While the role as guardians of local 
nature is a source of pride, it makes the local activists more reactive than 
proactive, and makes it harder to set new issues on the agenda. The biggest 
challenge is that these channels of influence, which primarily concerns 
new development or planning, may be of little use to change the status 
quo, with the exceptions of the municipal climate plans.  
Reviewing the existing trajectory of the organizations, it seems clear that 
much of the current friction cannot be attributed to the issue alone. The 
trends of professionalization and centralization is an important factor for 
why the climate activities initiated by the central level are predominantly 
top-down, and less focused on long-term organizational than short-term 
political goals. In the Norwegian case, the underlying center-periphery 
conflict seems to be an important factor in understanding local resistance 
to renewable energy.  
This has at least two implications: effective local climate work within the 
organizations must be adapted to these circumstance, and larger efforts to 
recruit and “activate” new members may encourage local chapters that are 
more receptive to working with climate issues. These effects warrants 
further study, and are important to understand both for organizations, 
governments and business interests. 
Another important find is that the climate may become more visible 
locally than it is today. As we have seen, the conceptualization of climate 
change as a “global” issue is an important reason for why local activists 
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does not engage it. However, this label is not given. This is not to say that 
some issues are not at their core more “global” or “local” than others, but 
that perspectives may shift, and make a myriad issues become apparent. 
Sometimes, as the old saying goes, you can’t see the forest for the trees, or 
in this case – the trees for the forest. In both organizations, local activists 
have themselves commented on this process, from the differing views on 
the Mejlflak project in Denmark, to the difference between the local leader 
in Oslo and Kristiansand in Norway.  
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7) What do you think is the most important climate-related issue in 
your country?  
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